Life Satisfaction Judgments and Item-Order Effects Across Cultures

We conducted two studies to investigate the item-order effect on life satisfaction judgments. In Study 1, Japanese and American participants completed various life-domain satisfaction items either before or after completing general life satisfaction items. American respondents weighed the best life domains more strongly than Japanese respondents, in particular when they answered domain satisfaction items before making life satisfaction judgments. Overall, Japanese tended to weigh the worst life domains more heavily when making life satisfaction judgments than Americans. We hypothesized that the Japanese patterns of life satisfaction judgments come from the chronic attention to others’ perspective. To examine this hypothesis in Study 2, Japanese participants were exposed to either the “other are not watching” or the “other are watching” manipulation. As expected, when Japanese participants were led to believe that “others are not watching,” they judged their overall life satisfaction based more heavily on the best life domains (like Americans in Study 1).     

Effect of Changes in Living Conditions on Well-Being: A Prospective Top–Down Bottom–Up Model

Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, we examined life-satisfaction and housing satisfaction before and after moving (N = 3,658 participants from 2,162 households) with univariate and bivariate two-intercept two-slope latent growth models. The main findings were (a) a strong and persistent increase in average levels of housing satisfaction, (b) no increase in average life-satisfaction, (c) low stability in individuals’ level of housing satisfaction, and (d) high stability in individuals’ level of life-satisfaction. The results are discussed in the context of top–down and bottom–up models as well as adaptation theories of well-being. We conclude that moving or living in a better home is unrelated to life-satisfaction judgments for two reasons. First, housing makes a small contribution to life-satisfaction judgments. Second, positive effects of better housing are undermined by the greater costs of living in a better home. The results provide no support for the prediction of adaptation theory that shifting aspirations undermine the benefits of living in a better home.     

An impossibility theorem for matching problems

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (Econ Theory 4:417–435, 1994) and Sönmez (Econ Des 1:365–380, 1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of respect for unanimity. First, we prove that a strategy-proof rule exists that is individually rational and respects unanimity. However, this rule is unreasonable in the sense that mutually best pairs of agents are matched on only rare occasions. In order to explore the possibility of better matching rules, we introduce a natural condition of “respect for 2-unanimity.” Respect for 2-unanimity states that a mutually best pair of agents should be matched, and an agent wishing to being unmatched should be unmatched. Our second result is negative. Secondly, we prove that no strategy-proof rule exists that respects 2-unanimity. This result implies Roth (Math Oper Res 7:617–628, 1962; J Econ Theory 36:277–288, 1985) showing that stable rules are manipulable.     

A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, weak symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences.     

New Well-being Measures: Short Scales to Assess Flourishing and Positive and Negative Feelings

Measures of well-being were created to assess psychological flourishing and feelings—positive feelings, negative feelings, and the difference between the two. The scales were evaluated in a sample of 689 college students from six locations. The Flourishing Scale is a brief 8-item summary measure of the respondent’s self-perceived success in important areas such as relationships, self-esteem, purpose, and optimism. The scale provides a single psychological well-being score. The measure has good psychometric properties, and is strongly associated with other psychological well-being scales. The Scale of Positive and Negative Experience produces a score for positive feelings (6 items), a score for negative feelings (6 items), and the two can be combined to create a balance score. This 12-item brief scale has a number of desirable features compared to earlier measures of positive and negative emotions. In particular, the scale assesses with a few items a broad range of negative and positive experiences and feelings, not just those of a certain type, and is based on the amount of time the feelings were experienced during the past 4 weeks. The scale converges well with measures of emotions and affective well-being.     

An introduction to the theory of constraint and how it can be applied to medical management

This overview of a new way of thinking about medical management problems could help physicians executives think about those problems differently.     

Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies

We study economies with one private good and one pure public good, and consider the following axioms of social choice functions. Strategy-proofness says that no agent can benefit by misrepresenting his preferences, regardless of whether the other agents misrepresent or not, and whatever his preferences are. Symmetry says that if two agents have the same preference, they must be treated equally. Anonymity says that when the preferences of two agents are switched, their consumption bundles are also switched. Individual rationality says that a social choice function never assigns an allocation which makes some agent worse off than he would be by consuming no public good and paying nothing. In Theorem 1, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, budget-balancing, and symmetric social choice functions, assuming convexity of the cost function of the public good. In Theorem 2, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, budget-balancing, and anonymous social choice functions. In Theorem 3, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, budget-balancing, symmetric, and individually rational social choice functions.     

The Relationship Between Social Support and Subjective Well-Being Across Age

The relationships among types of social support and different facets of subjective well-being (i.e., life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect) were examined in a sample of 1,111 individuals between the ages of 18 and 95. Using structural equation modeling we found that life satisfaction was predicted by enacted and perceived support, positive affect was predicted by family embeddedness and provided support, and negative affect was predicted by perceived support. When personality variables were included in a subsequent model, the influence of the social support variables were generally reduced. Invariance analyses conducted across age groups indicated that there were no substantial differences in predictors of the different types of subjective well-being across age.     

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies

We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy in The economics of market disequilibrium, Academic, New York, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: there is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaueddomain.     

Policy transfer from the UN to ASEAN: the case of trafficking in persons

This article examines the policy transfer from the United Nations (UN) to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the case of trafficking in persons (TIP). It presents pioneering empirical research that analyzes the processes and mechanisms of policy transfer between the UN and a regional organization. Institutional collective action and regime complex theories in international relations are used to complement the existing state-centric policy transfer framework. We argue that the UN-ASEAN policy transfer in TIP is characterized by a two-step process, starting with transfer from the UN to the ASEAN member states, followed by synthesis at the regional level. The consensus-based decision-making approach in ASEAN restricts transfer outcomes to a common low base of national preferences, which is the lowest common denominator. The ability of stakeholders in the TIP field to steer lesson drawing, emulation and coercive transfer at both the national and regional levels allows them to influence the lowest common denominator. At the same time, policy transfer to ASEAN is shaped by “forum-shopping” by the ASEAN member states and other stakeholders within the TIP regime complex, based on the comparative advantage between ASEAN and other cooperation mechanisms in solving TIP-related issues.