Divide the Dollar: Three solutions and extensions

Divide the Dollar (DD) is a game in which two players independently bid up to 100 cents for a dollar. Each player receives his or her bid if the sum of the bids does not exceed a dollar; otherwise they receive nothing. This game has multiple Nash equilibria, including the egalitarian division of (50, 50), but this division is not compelling except for its symmetry and presumed fairness.This division is easy to induce, however, by punishing — more severely than does DD — deviations from it, but these solutions are not reasonable. By altering the rules of DD, however, one can induce an egalitarian division (by successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies), but no reasonable payoff scheme produces this division with egalitarian bids of 50.Three alternatives to DD are analyzed. DD1, which rewards lowest bidders first, shows how an egalitarian outcome can be induced with equal but nonegalitarian bids. DD2, which adds a second stage that provides the players with new information yet restricts their choices at the same time, is used to introduce dominance inducibility. DD3 combines the features of DD1 and DD2, is reasonable (like DD1), makes calculations transparent (like DD2), and induces egalitarian bids as well as the egalitarian outcome. The possible application of the different procedures to a real-world allocation problem (setting of salaries by a team), in which there may be entitlements, is described.     

Contracting for Capacity under Renegotiation: Partner Preferences and the Value of Anticipating Renegotiation

This paper studies contract renegotiation in a stylized supply chain model. Two original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sign fixed‐quantity contracts with a contract manufacturer (CM) prior to demand realization. Contract renegotiation after demand realization allows the OEMs to use capacity that is more or less than what they contracted for. We assume that the extra profit due to efficient allocation of capacity is allocated to the supply chain parties according to the egalitarian rule and investigate when an OEM's expected post‐renegotiation profit is maximized. We aim to understand how an OEM's expected post‐renegotiation profit is affected by her ability to negotiate a low wholesale price in the initial contract as well as the ability of the other OEM to do the same. Regardless of whether renegotiation is anticipated or not at the time of the initial contract, we find that an OEM, who had weak buyer power vis‐a‐vis the CM and was unable to negotiate a low wholesale price in the initial contract, may benefit more from renegotiation than a stronger OEM. In addition, we show that how the expected post‐renegotiation profit of an OEM changes with demand variance or anticipating renegotiation depends on the strength of the OEM's buyer power. Finally, we numerically test the robustness of our results in a supply chain with three OEMs and also identify when the OEMs prefer to leave the CM out of the renegotiation.     

Attitude and Propensity to Divorce in Iran: Structural and Ideational Determinants

Divorce has been increasing worldwide, even in societies where religious impediments to it are strongest. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, divorce rates have risen rapidly since the mid-1990s. In this article, we investigate the attitude and propensity of young Iranians toward divorce and relate these attitudes and propensities to structural and ideational factors. The data are drawn from a survey of 720 married people ages 15 to 29 conducted in the city of Tehran in 2014. The results show that almost half of respondents approved of divorce as a solution for marital problems and one fifth of them have high propensity to divorce. Multivariate analyses indicate that approval of and high propensity toward divorce are significantly associated with ideational factors—namely individualism, secularism, and gender egalitarian views—and structural factors—including education, wife’s employment, and household economic insecurity—even after controlling for demographic variables. We discuss the implications of these findings for the understanding of marital stability in this rapidly changing context.     

Divide-the-Dollar Game Revisited

In the Divide-the-Dollar (DD) game, two players simultaneously make demands to divide a dollar. Each player receives his demand if the sum of the demands does not exceed one, a payoff of zero otherwise. Note that, in the latter case, both parties are punished severely. A major setback of DD is that each division of the dollar is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Observe that, when the sum of the two demands x and y exceeds one, it is as if Player 1's demand x (or his offer (1−x) to Player 2) suggests that Player 2 agrees to λ_x < 1 times his demand y so that Player 1's demand and Player 2's modified demand add up to exactly one; similarly, Player 2's demand y (or his offer (1−y) to Player 1) suggests that Player 1 agrees to λ_yx so that λ_yx+y = 1. Considering this fact, we change DD's payoff assignment rule when the sum of the demands exceeds one; here in this case, each player's payoff becomes his demand times his λ; i.e., each player has to make the sacrifice that he asks his opponent to make. We show that this modified version of DD has an iterated strict dominant strategy equilibrium in which each player makes the egalitarian demand 1/2. We also provide a natural N-person generalization of this procedure. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Ambivalent sexism and egalitarian ideology in perception of psychological abuse and (in)vulnerability to violence / Sexismo ambivalente e ideología igualitaria en la percepción del maltrato psicológico y la (in)vulnerabilidad a la violencia

Abstract

Psychological violence against women in intimate relations is one of the most widespread and hidden ways of limiting their human rights. Nowadays different ideologies, including sexism and feminism, can contribute to (dis)regard this phenomenon. This study focuses on the relationship between ambivalent sexism (in its hostile and benevolent dimensions) and feminism (in the egalitarian ideology dimension) with the identification of psychological violence and the perception of invulnerability to the intimate partner violence in women. The mediator role of the myths about gender-based violence in these relationships is analysed. Participants were 91 women, with heterogeneous socio-demographic characteristics. Results showed benevolent sexism as a risk factor and egalitarian feminism ideology as a protector factor in the process of the perception of psychological violence. The egalitarian feminism ideology also appears as the main predictor of the perception of invulnerability to abuse. This relationship is mediated by the degree of adhesion to the myths about gender-based violence. These findings reinforce the importance of the attitudinal and ideological factors in the perception of gender-based violence.     

关于分配正义的三个问题——与姚大志教授商榷

本文对姚大志教授的《分配正义:从弱势群体的观点看》(载《哲学研究》2011年第3期)一文中关于分配正义的论述提出三点不同意见:分配正义只涉及如何在人们中间分配财富、机会和资源,而不涉及人们在福利上得到不断改善;正义的分配是平等主义的分配,不平等的分配不能被看做是正义的;分配正义原则是判断分配正义与否的原则,而不是确定平等与福利的平衡点的原则。     

柯亨的平等主义理论建构进路

柯亨政治哲学中的平等主义理论有一个逐渐发展的建构过程,将柯亨的平等理论与罗尔斯的善的平等理论、阿玛蒂亚?森获得善或福利资源的可能性、德沃金资源平等理论等理论进行了比较分析。研究认为,柯亨提出了优势的机会平等的平等主义主张,认为正义社会需要经济和道德两个层面的支持;柯亨通过对富有的平等主义者身份的思考,认为富有者对利益的追逐系个人偏好选择,其道德正当性不能被论证;个人偏好影响个人行为,个人行为影响社会的价值判断,正义社会和个人行为有重大关联;风尚社会通过道德鼓励个人行为重视人与人之间的关心,从而实现社会的平等和正义。     

Remainers are nostalgic too: An exploration of attitudes towards the past and Brexit preferences

Nostalgia had a prominent place in the Brexit Referendum campaign, epitomized by Nigel Farage carrying around with him an old-fashioned blue British passport on the campaign trail. In this paper, we seek to examine British attitudes towards the past through a new survey instrument administered online in July and August 2018 (N = 3,000). We empirically establish two dimensions of nostalgia that are differentially associated with political preferences. We conclude that it is the substance of the nostalgia that matters, not the looking towards the past per se.     

Feminism and the Challenges of the "Post-Cold War' World

Women's political participation is increasing in many countries around the world, but their participation in democratic politics has not altered the neoliberal consensus that is harmful to their interests. Two reasons for this are explored here: the impact of the Cold War in shaping the post-Cold War discourse on markets and states, and the anti-state bias of much of contemporary feminist theory. The essay calls for a rethinking of the consequences of difference theories for feminist political practices, and for a renewed focus on redistributional issues.