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碳排放监管中政府与企业演化博弈及策略研究:基于第三方监督视角
引用本文:张凯泽,沈菊琴,徐沙沙,孙付华.碳排放监管中政府与企业演化博弈及策略研究:基于第三方监督视角[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2020,26(4):82-92.
作者姓名:张凯泽  沈菊琴  徐沙沙  孙付华
作者单位:河海大学 商学院, 江苏 南京 211100
基金项目:江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目"基于环境保护的地下水水权交易定价方法研究"(KYCX18_0520);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助"基于环境保护的地下水水权交易定价方法研究"(2018B712X14);国家自然科学基金项目"基于三对均衡关系的碳排放初始权配制方法研究"(41471457)
摘    要:加强碳排放监管是实现政府"建立健全绿色低碳循环发展的经济体系"战略方针的重要保障。企业作为环境的主要破坏者承担着碳减排的重任并接受社会监督。在政府管制下,企业被动参与碳减排,但偷排、超排现象时有发生。文章针对政府碳排放监管问题,分析了影响企业碳排放的相关因素。从第三方监督视角出发,在考虑政府、企业、第三方监督主体均为有限理性条件下,建立了政府与企业在碳排放监管中的演化博弈模型。研究了在第三方监督主体参与下,政府和企业之间的有限动态策略选择和不同参数变化下双方的策略选择演化趋势,并运用Matlab软件对结果进行仿真。结果表明第三方监督在政府与企业碳排放过程中具有显著作用,可以直接影响政府与企业的决策选择。因此,加强第三方监督力度可以提高政府监管效率,缓解政府监管压力,降低政府监管成本,督促企业合规排放二氧化碳。但第三方监督力量过大会弱化政府监管效力。最后,为政府更有效地引入第三方监督主体提出对策与建议。

关 键 词:碳排放  第三方监督  政府  企业  演化博弈  仿真分析
收稿时间:2019/3/19 0:00:00

Research of evolutionary game and strategy between government and enterprises in carbon emission supervision: Based on the perspective of the third party
ZHANG Kaize,SHEN Juqin,XU Shash,SUN Fuhua.Research of evolutionary game and strategy between government and enterprises in carbon emission supervision: Based on the perspective of the third party[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Social Sciences Edition),2020,26(4):82-92.
Authors:ZHANG Kaize  SHEN Juqin  XU Shash  SUN Fuhua
Institution:School of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China
Abstract:Strengthening carbon emission supervision is an important guarantee for realizing the government''s strategic policy of "establishing an economic system with green and low-carbon recycling development". As the main factor of destroying the environment, enterprises bear the responsibility of carbon emission reduction and social supervision. Under the government''s control, enterprises participate in carbon emission reduction passively, but smuggling and over-discharge have occurred from time to time. This article analyzes the relevant factors affecting corporate carbon emissions in response to government carbon emissions regulatory issues. From the perspective of third-party supervision, under the consideration of the government, enterprises and third-party supervision subjects, the evolutionary game model of government and enterprises in carbon emission regulation is established. Under the participation of the third-party supervisory body, the limited dynamic strategy choice among the government and the enterprise as well as the evolution trend of the strategic choices of the two parties under different parameters are studied, and the results are simulated by Matlab software. The results show that third-party supervision plays a significant role in the government and enterprise carbon emissions process, and can directly influence the decision-making choices of the government and enterprises. Therefore, strengthening the supervision of third parties can improve the efficiency of government supervision, ease the pressure of government supervision, reduce the cost of government supervision, and urge enterprises to comply with the emission of carbon dioxide. However, the oversight of the third party has weakened the effectiveness of government regulation. Finally, it proposes countermeasures and suggestions for the government to introduce third-party supervisory bodies more effectively.
Keywords:carbon emission  third party supervision  government  enterprises  evolutionary game  simulation analysis
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