首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

管理者分享企业剩余索取权及其激励模型分析——以管理层收购企业为例
引用本文:孙利.管理者分享企业剩余索取权及其激励模型分析——以管理层收购企业为例[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2008,10(6):497-500.
作者姓名:孙利
作者单位:天津大学社会科学与外国语学院,天津,300072
基金项目:天津市哲学社会科学研究规划基金 
摘    要:管理者分享企业剩余的制度安排有利于调动管理者的工作积极性,降低代理成本,进而提高企业经济绩效。管理层收购实现了企业剩余控制权与剩余索取权的统一,有利于经营者的自我激励。收购企业股权越多,激励与监督作用越强。当管理者不能收购企业全部股权时,其他所有者持有股权的集中度对监督管理者具有重要意义。

关 键 词:剩余索取权  激励  管理层收购

Analysis of Manager Sharing Residual Claim Right and Incentive Model——Example of Management Buyout
SUN Li.Analysis of Manager Sharing Residual Claim Right and Incentive Model——Example of Management Buyout[J].Journal of Tianjin University(Social Sciences),2008,10(6):497-500.
Authors:SUN Li
Institution:SUN Li ( School of Social Sciences and Foreign Languages, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China )
Abstract:The arrangement of manager sharing the residual right of the finn which he served is in favor of inspiring his enthusiasm and reducing agency cost, and furthermore improving the economic performance of the corporation. After management buyout(MBO), the claim to the firm's residue combines with the claim to the finn's residual control, the manager can be self-inspired. And the more the manager buys the firm stock, the more the manager will be inspired and supervised. Supposing the manager does not hold the ownership of the firm as a whole, the concentration of the stock owned by other stockholders is important for them to supervise the manager.
Keywords:residual claim right  incentive  management buyout
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号