首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于决策者风险规避特性的供应链需求信息共享价值分析
引用本文:叶飞,陈晓明,林强.基于决策者风险规避特性的供应链需求信息共享价值分析[J].管理工程学报,2012(3):176-183,196.
作者姓名:叶飞  陈晓明  林强
作者单位:华南理工大学工商管理学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971042,71001041,71172075);广东省高等学校人文社会科学创新团队项目(08JDTDXM63002);华南理工大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2009ZM0240,2011SG0003,2011ZM0037)
摘    要:在随机需求条件下,利用条件风险估值(conditional value-at-risk,CVaR)的风险度量准则建立了供应链的需求信息共享决策模型,着重分析了零售商的风险规避程度以及市场需求的不确定性信息对供应链各决策者以及供应链整体信息共享价值的影响。研究结果表明,需求信息共享价值与零售商的风险规避程度、市场不确定性大小以及市场不确定信息所预测的市场需求变化情况有关。数值分析结果表明,零售商越害怕市场的不确定性风险,需求信息共享越有利于提升分散供应链的运作效率;但当市场信息反映出未来的市场需求是消极且零售商接近风险中性时,供应链的需求信息共享价值反而小于零,此时没有进行信息共享的必要。

关 键 词:供应链  随机需求  CVaR  需求信息共享价值

Analysis of Supply Chain’s Demand Information Sharing Values Based on Decision-Maker′s Risk Aversion Characteristics
YE Fei,CHEN Xiao-ming,LIN Qiang.Analysis of Supply Chain’s Demand Information Sharing Values Based on Decision-Maker′s Risk Aversion Characteristics[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2012(3):176-183,196.
Authors:YE Fei  CHEN Xiao-ming  LIN Qiang
Institution:(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China)
Abstract:In the 21st century,enterprises are competing with each other on supply chain efficiency and effectiveness.Although information integration across supply chain partners is critical to supply chain competitiveness and profitability,its actualization remains challenging because of the prevalent information sharing barriers,such as asymmetric information,bounded rationality,opportunism,risk prevention,etc. The current literature often calculates information sharing values in a supply chain based on the assumption that decision-makers are risk neutral.This paper proposes a new model be built to consider the potential impact of decision makers’ risk aversion characteristics.We therefore propose a supply chain demand information-sharing model based conditional value-at-risk criterion under stochastic demand.This paper analyzes how a retailer′s risk aversion and demand uncertainty would affect the information sharing value of supply chain. We build a Stackelberg game that considers supplier and retailer as leader and follower.This study assumes that the retailer is able to pay a certain fee to obtain information about demand uncertainty and can decide whether to share this information with its suppliers.We also study the optimal decisions under the centralized supply chain system as a comparative study.We further analyze the influence of the system on the value of information sharing between retailer and supplier.An incentive model to share information among supply chain partners is constructed. The results show that the value of demand information sharing is related to the retailer′s risk aversion,the degree of demand uncertainty and how the demand will change in different conditions.When the demand uncertainty shows that demand will increase,demand information sharing will increase supply chain′s performance in most conditions.At the same time,the supplier will compensate its retailer to benefit both sides for information sharing activities.When the demand uncertainty shows that demand will decrease,two scenarios will need to be considered.The first scenario is that if retailer′s risk aversion is high information sharing can still contribute to the increased supply chain performance via supplier’s compensation for the retailer.The second scenario is if the retailer′s risk aversion is low,information sharing becomes unnecessary.The numerical results indicate three findings.First,the higher the retailer’s risk aversion the more information will be shared to improve the efficiency of decentralized supply chain.Second,the increased demand uncertainty can motivate the retailer and the supplier to share more information,thereby improving supply chain efficiency.Third,if market information shows positive prospect,supplier’s payment can help improve information sharing activities.On the other hand,information sharing becomes unnecessary if market information shows negative prospect and retailer’s risk aversion is low because information sharing can potentially decrease the benefit for the entire supply chain.
Keywords:supply chain  stochastic demand  CVaR  value of demand information sharing
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号