| 上市公司诚信问题的博弈分析及对策研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李伟,王代敬.上市公司诚信问题的博弈分析及对策研究[J].西华师范大学学报(自然科学版),2004(2):11-13. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李伟 王代敬 |
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| 作者单位： | 西华师范大学区域经济研究所，西华师范大学区域经济研究所 四川南充637002，四川南充637002 |
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| 摘 要： | 上市公司诚信问题已成为制约我国证券市场健康发展的一个难题。上市公司之所以能屡屡造假成功,根源于委托———代理制下市场信息的严重不对称。本文通过对上市公司造假行为的博弈分析,指出引入上市公司内部的制衡机制,完善上市公司的法人治理结构,并辅之以及时、严格的外部监管,才能最大程度地减少上市公司的造假行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 诚信 博弈分析 独立董事制度 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-1465(2004)02-0011-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年4月25日 |
GAME ANALYSES OF LISTED COMPANY'S FALSE INFORMATION AND STUDY FOR COUNTERMEASURES |
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| LI Wei,WANG Dai-jing.GAME ANALYSES OF LISTED COMPANY''''S FALSE INFORMATION AND STUDY FOR COUNTERMEASURES[J].Journal of China West Normal University:Philosophy & Social Sciences,2004(2):11-13. |
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| Authors: | LI Wei WANG Dai-jing |
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| Abstract: | The false financial information of listed companies has become a difficult problem, which constrains the development of our country's security market. Because of the serious nonsymmetry of market information in the premise of principle-agent mechanism, listed companies succeed in accounting false information again and again. After the game analysis of listed company's false information, the article points out that only the constrained mechanism is constructed and the corporation governance is completed, the false financial information can be lessened to the most degree. |
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| Keywords: | honesty game analysis independent directors system |
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