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政府委任制与非合作博弈
引用本文:张尔升,夏祥禹,蒋咏涛.政府委任制与非合作博弈[J].安徽农业大学学报(社会科学版),2003,12(3):43-46.
作者姓名:张尔升  夏祥禹  蒋咏涛
作者单位:安徽省阜阳市委党校,安徽,阜阳,236034
摘    要:大量的调查研究表明:企业职工,社会公众与国有企业经理的任命方式是一种博弈关系。政府通过行政手段任命经理,往往使经理与政府产生不合作博弈。作者通过建立两类数学模型,选取两个典型企业的指标验证了这一观点。

关 键 词:国有企业经理  任命  经济体制改革  合作博弈  非合作博弈
文章编号:1009-2463(2003)03-0043-04
修稿时间:2003年2月8日

System in Charge of Government and Non - cooperative Game
ZHANG Er - sheng,XIA Xiang - yu and JIANG Yong - tao.System in Charge of Government and Non - cooperative Game[J].Journal of Anhui Agricultural University(Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition),2003,12(3):43-46.
Authors:ZHANG Er - sheng  XIA Xiang - yu and JIANG Yong - tao
Institution:Community Party School of Fuyang, Anhui Province;Community Party School of Fuyang, Anhui Province;Community Party School of Fuyang, Anhui Province
Abstract:A lot of investigations and studies show:business workers and social citizens are game theory with manager appointing type about state- run enterprises.It is a subject to prove and explain that the government appoints the managers who are prone to make non- cooperative game.To make round this,it sets up two kinds of mathematical model and selects two typical firms targets to test and verify this viewwpoint
Keywords:manager of state- run enterprises  appoint  economicsystem reform  cooperative game  non- cooperative game  
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