腐败裂变式扩散:一种社会交换分析

腐败与反腐败是一个不断博弈的矛盾过程，腐败的形态在反腐败中不断演变。随着腐败产生的制度环境发生变化，当前中国腐败现象的蔓延形态呈现出“裂变式扩散”，即腐败从个体向群体甚至向整个组织扩散，从低层级按管理逻辑向高层扩散。对中国腐败裂变式扩散现象进行社会交换分析，发现其存在两种动力机制：一是内驱机制，即腐败行动者为了更安全地实现利益扩张而建构腐败关系网络；二是外驱机制，即腐败行动者受到圈子内规范约束而维护腐败关系网络。腐败关系网络的生产和再生产导致了腐败裂变式扩散。但腐败的裂变式扩散是一个通过策略实施耦合上述两种动力机制的复杂过程。腐败行动者通过风险评估和试探交换策略来寻找腐败交换对象，通过拟亲化和服务渗透策略使自身进入“自家人”圈子，通过共赢共溃策略来增强腐败群体的利益共同体意识。腐败交换秩序是上述策略实施的综合结果，这种微观社会秩序生产着支持自身运作的规范与逻辑。

Corruption Fission: A Social Exchange Analysis

The form of corruption evolves in the continuous games with anti-corruption. With the change of institutional environment caused by corruption, a salient symptom of corruption in current China is its fission: corruption spreads from individuals to groups and then to the whole organization, from lower-level administrators to higher-level leaders according to the managerial logic. In essence, corruption fission is an on-going process during which the corrupt actors produce and reproduce the corruption networks by committing illegal interest exchanges. This article develops a social exchange analysis to this phenomenon and attempts to answer two basic questions: why and how corruption in China takes on a form of fission. Social exchange theory integrates and complements to some extent the rational choice perspective, the organizational institutional perspective and the social network perspective, providing a relatively complete theoretical framework to explain the dynamics and tactics underpinning the corruption fission. Two main dynamics have been identified, namely the internal dynamic and the external dynamic. Specifically, the internal dynamic, regarding the corrupt actors as the fission initiators, demonstrates that they tend to embed themselves into the multi-level corruption networks by seeking for the cover-up and assimilating the immediate colleagues, so as to establish offensive and defensive alliances to make their illegal exchange safer. By contrast, the external dynamic, seeing the corrupt actors as the diffusion receivers, indicates that those who are embedded in the family or acquaintance networks and restricted by the ethical norms of quanzi, e.g. responsibility and renqing, tend to adopt a view of exceptionalism to maintain and expand the improper interest of the quanzi members. To realise the corruption fission, however, it also needs multiple tactics to effectively couple the above two dynamics. The corrupt actors adopt differing exchange tactics based on the stage characteristics of the corruption fission. The corruption fission consists of four stages, i.e. choosing the exchange actors, investing in the exchange relationship, balancing the exchange power and finally establishing the exchange order. Therefore, corrupt actors choose the corrupt exchange parties through risk assessment and tentative social exchange tactics, enter into the “my family” quanzi through simulant-intimate and service penetration tactics and enhance the awareness of interest community through coexistence tactics. A corrupt exchange order is the result of the comprehensive use of those tactics. This micro social order generates self-support norms and logics, which, in turn, facilitate the institutionalization of the corruption fission. To curb the corruption fission in China, it requires integrated measures. Firstly, it hinges on the perfection of the power restriction and supervision system that aims to avoid overconcentration of power and secure the publicity of decision-making. Secondly, we must enhance the corruption cost and implement the consistent punishments on the briber and bribee. Thirdly, the rule of law should be promoted to prevent the permeation of kinship and renqing to the public power area.