中国上市公司CEO继任特征与公司业绩变化关系的实证研究

选择总资产主营业务利润率、总资产营业利润率、总资产净利润率作为评价公司业绩的指标,以CEO非常规变更、CEO外部继任、CEO是否受控股股东控制、CEO变更公告的时间以及继任CEO的年龄刻画CEO的继任特征,采用OLS与Logist回归方法,实证检验了3个指标在CEO变更期间的变化与CEO继任特征的相关性.研究表明,CEO变更期间的业绩变化与外部继任显著正相关,变更当年的业绩变化与CEO下半年变更显著负相关,公司业绩变化与控股股东对CEO控制倾向正相关,CEO的非常规变更并未带来上市公司业绩的显著提高.     

继任CEO扬弃的艺术

前任领导在位时间越长、个人影响力越大,继任CEO与前任的管理风格差异越大,管理过渡的阴影效应也越明显。     

CEO-TMT交界视角:CEO继任背景下CEO-TMT特征孤立性与企业创新强度的关系

在CEO继任背景下,新任CEO往往面对新职位以及新团队的挑战,其与现任高管成员的特征对比一定程度上能反映新任CEO与高管成员的磨合和融入过程,进而对新任CEO及高管团队(TMT)的创新战略选择产生影响.本研究基于CEO-TMT交界视角及团队断裂理论,构建出CEO-TMT特征孤立性这一新的反映CEO与TMT成员多维特征对比的关系人口学变量,并探索该变量在CEO继任背景下将如何对企业创新强度产生影响.通过对2012-2014年间657家A股上市公司的CEO继任样本进行分析,研究发现,CEO-TMT知识孤立性对企业创新强度具有促进作用;而CEO-TMT认同孤立性会弱化CEO-TMT知识孤立性对企业创新强度的正向作用;CEO-TMT地位孤立性将增强CEO-TMT知识孤立性对企业创新强度的正向作用;与此同时,竞争者继任背景下,CEO-TMT知识孤立性对企业创新强度具有最积极的影响.本文深化了对高管团队特征构成的理解,丰富了CEO继任背景下CEO与高管团队之间的交界对企业创新影响的研究.     

D汽车公司CEO及直属一级高管继任计划与实施——基于HR主管的视角

现如今,企业面临的竞争环境日益激烈,高素质人才特别是高级管理人才已经成为企业可持续发展并增加核心竞争力的关键因素。     

脱下战袍的CEO财富修养

至少有四分之一的CEO没有做好退休的准备．他们不能接受自己不再是最高领导的现实．这种恐惧总困扰著他们，     

领导继任问题的国际前沿与研究成果评述

依据有关文献分析框架,选取国际上12种一流学术核心期刊,以2005～2010年间所发表的全部领导继任问题研究论文为样本,对领导继任问题研究领域的研究问题、研究方法和研究结论进行了回顾和评述。研究结果表明,关于领导继任问题还缺乏整合型的理论研究,且研究方法相对单一。最后,对如何在全球视野下开展中国领导继任的本土研究提出了具体建议。     

上市公司经营者继任的绩效意义

经营者的继任及其继任形式对公司的市场绩效具有影响,体现在股价即时变动的信号效应和公司系统风险水平发生变更的管理效应上。本文对沪深300指数成份股公司2001-2003年的301例董事长和总经理继任事件,用事件研究方法分析了经营者继任的信号效应,用邹检验识别了经营者继任的管理效应。研究表明,经营者继任形式是影响信号效应的重要因素,而经营者继任事件导致的管理效应是普遍存在的。另外,与国外同类研究的比较表明,中外上市公司经营者继任的绩效意义既有相似之处,也有不同之处。     

当前农村家庭财产现状与财富效应研究

我国广大农村地区的家庭财产问题愈来愈受到社会各界的高度重视,甚至对宏观经济大势都具有相当重大的影响。所以,分析研究我国农村家庭的财产现状及其财富效应,也就显得十分重要了。本文在调查当前农村家庭财产现状的基础上,提出了进一步发挥农村家庭财富效应的几点措施。     

我国住宅市场财富效应研究

通过对我国总体数据的实证分析发现,预期收入增长对总消费具有显著正的影响;预期住宅价格对总消费也有显著正的影响,即我国住宅市场财富效应是显著存在的。这与最近关于OECD国家住宅市场研究中的结论是相吻合的。     

Industrial Origin of CEOs in Outside Succession: Board Preference and Stockholder Reaction

Although scholars have studied outside executive succession for decades, there is still no clear definition of the term outsider. We focus on a new dimension of outsiderness, the industrial background of executives hired from outside the firm into a CEO position. This paper examines the antecedents of boards' decisions on the industry origin of outside successors as well as the short-term stock market response. We find that firms with more independent boards and with blockholders owning large amounts of stock are more likely to hire industry unrelated successors. However, the board's decision does not strictly follow the rhetoric of stockholder's interests. The stock market reacts more positively to outside CEO succession announcements when the CEO comes from an industry related firm. These findings support our theoretical arguments that the boards of directors may use a logic or rule of appropriateness in deciding the industrial origin of outside successors.     

Fresh in the saddle: The influence of a new CEO's vision and origin,and CEO succession type on market actors' reactions

CEO succession is a critical event in the life of a company. How external stakeholders respond to it, can affect the company's valuation. This study investigates how securities analysts' and investors' reactions to CEO succession are affected by the interplay between the charisma of the new CEO's vision, the new CEO's origin (whether an insider or outsider), and the type of CEO succession (whether routine, dismissal or interim). Drawing on the literature on signaling, we suggest that because a charismatic vision emits a positive signal about the company's future performance, it will affect market actors' reactions by either weakening or strengthening the influence of the signals emitted by other succession context contingencies, namely, CEO origin and succession type. To test our predictions regarding analysts' and investors' reactions, we respectively analyze panel data and conduct an event study. The results support most of our predictions. We discuss the study's contributions and implications.     

机构投资者、流动性与信息效率

董事会分离原本两职合一的领导权结构包含了充分的信息传递过程.基于代理理论,从董事会开启分离决议的视角,探讨以企业价值变动为主导的董事会分离两职合一决策的内在机理.以2006年至2013年中国沪、深两市A股上市公司为样本,选择董事会领导权变更数据,通过构建Probit和Logistic模型回归进行实证研究.研究结果表明,董事会领导权结构中董事长与CEO两职合一向分离转化并不都是企业在价值下降时出于缓和代理问题所致.两职合一向分离转化时,企业价值越高,越倾向于一种过渡形式的分离,即学徒式分离,这是基于企业战略继任的需要;两职合一向分离转化时,企业价值越低,则越倾向于离职式分离和降职式分离,顺应了企业缓和代理问题的需要.进一步的研究表明,独立董事对于董事会的分离决议没有明显促进作用,而高管个人职业生涯潜力对于董事会分离决议有明显的调节作用.上市公司两职合一向分离转化随着类型不一所传递的信息不同,包含了价值变动、战略继任和代理问题等多种信息.     

董事会特征与总经理变更

本文以在上海证券交易所1999年前上市的公司为样本,研究董事会特征等治理变量对总经理变更的影响。研究结果表明,对相对业绩下降公司的总经理变更能起到显著解释作用的变量只有董事会会议的次数和公司的领导结构。而其它治理变量,诸如董事会规模、管理董事比例、独立董事比例、股权集中度、董事会成员持股比例等,未能对总经理变更起到显著的解释作用。     

基于BP神经网络的上市公司CEO报酬实证研究

近年来的研究表明,CEO报酬不仅受公司业绩的影响,还受到其他诸多因素的影响,而且,CEO报酬与其决定因素之间往往存在着非线性关系。本文以2003-2005年沪深股市的A股上市公司为样本,采用BP神经网络对CEO总报酬、CEO年薪、CEO持股价值及其决定因素分别进行训练和学习,结果表明:(1)网络训练输出值与实际值的拟合度分别达到91.09%、97.23%和78.44%;(2)网络的预测能力相对于传统的线性回归模型分别提高了92.72%、92.08%和53.89%。因此,本文认为在分析和确定CEO报酬水平时引入神经网络模型是可行的。     

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects

In a differential information economy with quasi–linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well–behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.     

The face of wrongdoing? An expectancy violations perspective on CEO facial characteristics and media coverage of misconducting firms

We examine the extent to which CEO facial characteristics matter in media coverage of firms implicated in corporate wrongdoing. We build on literature discussing that leaders’ faces may convey subjective behavioral expectations and that outsiders often over-rely on facial cues when making social judgments. We situate these insights in the context of corporate wrongdoing, where information incompleteness may be particularly high, potentially prompting outsiders to draw on CEO facial characteristics in forming their social judgments. Drawing on Expectancy Violations Theory, we hypothesize that firms led by CEOs expected to be more trustworthy, as inferred from their lower facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR), will draw greater attention and more negative opinions from the media in the wake of corporate wrongdoing. Results of an experiment (Study 1) where CEO fWHR was digitally manipulated support this counterintuitive logic, while findings based on an archival study of corporate wrongdoing of US firms from 2003 to 2016 (Study 2) partly generalize the rationale in the field setting. Our findings suggest that subjective expectations inferred from CEO faces may serve as part of a complex and underexamined source of variation in media coverage of misconducting firms. We discuss implications for theory and practice.     

基于财富效用的产权协商交易定价的计算求解和参数分析

本文以案例研究的方式,根据人们对财富价值的偏好,通过构造产权交易中所获利润的财富效用函数,建产了权交易定价的协商模型,导出协商交易价格的加权边际效用零和方程。通过案例的数值计算研究了交易人的偏好,交易底价,协商势力和信息量等参数的不对称性对均衡价格的影响。进一步分析了产权买方财富拥有量变动对均衡价格的影响。本文研究结论可为产权协商交易定价的机制设计提供理论依据。     

The influence of CEO equity incentives on licensing

In a study of life science firms, we find that, in accordance with predictions drawn from agency theory and behavioral agency theory, CEO stock ownership is negatively associated with licensing while CEO stock options are positively associated with licensing. Furthermore, by combining theoretical insights from the capabilities literature with both agency theory and behavioral agency theory, we predict that a key measure of capabilities in the licensing context—a firm's alliance experience—significantly influences the ways in which CEO equity incentives impact licensing. More specifically, we find that, in accordance with our theoretical predictions, alliance experience positively (negatively) moderates the relationship between CEO stock ownership (CEO stock options) and licensing. Our study contributes to the wider literature on the determinants of licensing by examining whether licensing is sensitive to CEO equity incentives. We also extend the capabilities literature on licensing by examining the contrasting influences of a firm's alliance experience on the relationship between CEO equity incentives and licensing. Our findings also inform behavioral agency-based research on the effects of equity incentives by highlighting the usefulness of a capabilities perspective in augmenting our understanding of the behavioral role of CEO equity incentives.