政策性负担和国有银行激励机制的相关性研究

大量文献集中研究了软预算约束的起源以及政策性负担和银行不良资产.由于政策性负担不仅产生了软预算约束问题,影响委托人的效用函数,而且加深了信息不对称程度,导致经营者追求灰色收入.在委托代理理论的框架下,将经营者的努力分为经营性和非经营性努力,在Holmstrom-Milgrom多项工作模型基础上,建立多期激励模型分析政策性负担与银行激励机制的相关性,结果发现政策性负担降低了银行经营者的经营努力,扭曲了银行的激励,机制.     

预算软约束成因分析

预算软约束是科尔奈在分析社会主义企业行为时首先提出的概念,该文认为预算软约束产生的根本原因是民主异化与所有制异化的共同作用,对非职工所有者分配到的利润没有影响的预算软约束不是真正的预算软约束。     

硬预算约束假定及主流宏观经济学于转轨经济之局限性

宏观经济学之古典和凯恩斯两大传统,根本分野不在于别的方面,而在于市场能否连续出清假定上。无论是新古典模型的市场连续出清假定,还是凯恩斯主义的市场不能连续出清假定,都隐含行为主体对于价格敏感,即硬预算约束的假定。硬预算约束下价格变量和数量变量相互依赖、互为决定,但软预算约束下价格变量与数量变量之间的联系就断裂了;软预算约束下行为主体对于数量变量敏感,对于价格变量则不敏感。因此软预算约束下各种冲击的传导机制和冲击效应就会不同于硬预算约束下的情况,财政政策、货币政策的传导机制和政策效应也会不同于硬预算约束下的情况。由于转轨经济普遍存在软预算约束,因此以主流宏观经济理论来解释转轨经济的宏观经济现象、指导转轨经济的宏观调控,难免出偏差。     

国有企业软预算约束对资本结构的影响研究

软预算约束问题一直是中国国有企业面临的基本问题,资本结构也对企业决策有重要影响。本文用2000～2016年的上市国有企业数据考察了软预算约束对国有企业资本结构的影响情况。研究发现,作为软预算约束代理变量的过度投资与企业不同期限的杠杆率存在显著的正相关关系,软预算约束的存在会提高企业的杠杆水平。     

企业软预算约束的成因综述

"软预算约束"是指政府不能承诺不去解救亏损的国有企业,解救措施包括财政补贴、贷款支持等等.经验表明,软预算约束现象出现在任何经济制度中,尤其是在社会主义和后社会主义转型中更频繁、更广泛地出现.     

政策性负担与企业的预算软约束:来自中国的实证研究

社会主义经济中的国有企业一旦发生亏损,政府常常要追加投资、增加贷款、减少税收、并提供财政补贴,这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈(Kornai,1986)称为“预算软约束”。究竟是什么原因导致了预算软约束的存在,是理论界争论的热点问题之一。本文分析了预算软约束现象的根源。我们认为是政策性负担而不是所有制归属导致了此现象。本文的目的在于用中国工业企业的统计资料来检验政策性负担对预算软约束的影响,以及其他竞争性理论观点的正确性和可靠性。我们的假说得到了经验证据的支持。     

商业银行软预算约束与中国银行业改革

软预算约束使得中国的商业银行能够在不良资产率如此之高的情况下维持运行,然而软预算约束的负面影响也是不可忽视的,会对公平竞争造成破坏,无论是对商业银行还是对政府而言都有着很大的破坏。因此中国银行业要积极进行改革,强化对中国商业银行的预算约束。     

国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理

《:杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效》一文指出,债务融资非但没有提升我国的公司治理水平,反而扩大了经理的代理成本(田利辉,2004)。本文进一步探讨债务融资和经理代理成本协同关系的产生原因。通过实证分组分析我国上市公司,本文发现,随着银行贷款规模的增大,在国家控股的上市公司中,经理层的公款消费和自由现金流增大,企业效率和公司价值下降;在民营资本主导的上市公司中,上述关系并不显著。本文论证,借款企业和贷款银行共同的国家所有产权是银行贷款和企业经理腐败协同关系存在的必要条件。也就是说,杠杆治理扭曲的制度原因是预算软约束。     

“政资分开”能改善国有企业投资效率吗?

我国新时代深化国有企业改革的重要方向是以管企业为主向以管资本为主转变，实现“政资分开”.本文选择实施国有资本经营预算制度作为促进“政资分开”的重要举措，发现其对国有企业的投资效率具有显著的正向影响.进一步分析表明，国有资本经营预算制度对投资过度的国有企业、高干预地区的国有企业，以及对具有较高程度预算软约束的国有企业的投资效率具有更大的改善作用，说明减少政府对国有企业的干预以及约束预算软约束下的投资过度行为是国有资本经营预算制度提升国有企业投资效率的重要作用机制.这些发现为深化国企改革，优化国有资本配置，及公有制和市场经济的兼容性提供了有力的经验证据.     

道德风险下的我国出口保理商与保理业务中其他三方的风险博弈

为了研究和避免我国企业在叙作国际保理业务时所面临的道德风险，本文根据国际保理的业务特点。在参与约束和激励相客约束下，从建立只有两种选择的。道德风险模型开始，得出保理各方的信息不对称是产生道德风险的主要原因，叙作保理业务的银行应制订合理的合同，激励参与者付出高努力？并保证高努力的参与企业能得到高回报。     

Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy

Both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler's incentive to minimize expected costs of moral‐hazard rents for high officials. We consider a dynamic moral‐hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince, who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises. To minimize costs, a governor's rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay. In the long run, we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler. Dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions, but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices, and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring. A soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low‐credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low.     

Understanding Public Sector Debt: Financial Vicious Circle under the Soft Budget Constraint

The article explains why debt of public sector organizations grows beyond the sustainable level by focusing on the principal-agent relationship under the soft budget constraint. Specifically, this article explores the extent to which factors affect the level of public sector debt in the context of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (quangos) in Korea over the past two decades (1993–2012). The findings from the panel data analysis suggest that the level of public sector debt increases as an outcome of the financial vicious circle created by the soft budget constraint: a knock-on effect of the moral hazard of quangos as well as the opportunistic behavior of political principals. Public sector debt is positively associated with agency-specific factors as well as the factors related to the political incentives such as policy preferences and electoral considerations. However, macroeconomic factors made little difference to the general pattern of the evidence.     

战略扩张与融资选择

结合信息经济学和代理成本理论的研究结论建立了一个公司扩张战略对融资契约影响 的模型. 研究结果显示公司横向一体化战略扩张所获得的剩余与债务比率正相关,但是如果公 司计划从纵向一体化中获得剩余,减少负债水平并增加专用性投资水平是理性选择. 而且模型 对公司融资契约的委托代理问题进行了分析,认为现金流对融资契约产生重要影响. 在此基础 上对模型的主要结论进行了实证检验,检验结果与主要研究结果相吻合. 最后,为公司战略扩 张和融资决策提供了若干建议.     

地方政府竞争、征税成本与金融资产质量

本文从理论和实证两方面探讨了在地方政府竞争背景下,地方政府征税成本对货币发行与地区金融资产质量的影响.本文的研究发现由于从金融部门荻取金融资源这一外部性很强的方式成为地方政府间竞争的重要手段,其后果将使地方政府特别是难以获得充足税收收入的地方政府更倾向于通过干预金融部门为公共投资融资,这构成了引起地方金融资产质量下降,金融生态环境难以改善的重要制度性原因.本文认为只有继续深化金融改革,提高金融部门独立性,并且使地方政府财权和事权相适应,才可能正确引导地方政府积极性.使地方财政和金融两方面都步入良性循环的轨道.     

Dynamic Financial Constraints: Distinguishing Mechanism Design From Exogenously Incomplete Regimes

We formulate and solve a range of dynamic models of constrained credit/insurance that allow for moral hazard and limited commitment. We compare them to full insurance and exogenously incomplete financial regimes (autarky, saving only, borrowing and lending in a single asset). We develop computational methods based on mechanism design, linear programming, and maximum likelihood to estimate, compare, and statistically test these alternative dynamic models with financial/information constraints. Our methods can use both cross‐sectional and panel data and allow for measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate the models using data on Thai households running small businesses from two separate samples. We find that in the rural sample, the exogenously incomplete saving only and borrowing regimes provide the best fit using data on consumption, business assets, investment, and income. Family and other networks help consumption smoothing there, as in a moral hazard constrained regime. In contrast, in urban areas, we find mechanism design financial/information regimes that are decidedly less constrained, with the moral hazard model fitting best combined business and consumption data. We perform numerous robustness checks in both the Thai data and in Monte Carlo simulations and compare our maximum likelihood criterion with results from other metrics and data not used in the estimation. A prototypical counterfactual policy evaluation exercise using the estimation results is also featured.     

基于逆周期缓冲机制的或有可转债研究

基于逆周期缓冲机制的双触发器或有可转债（简记为CoCoCb）为债券发行银行提供资本再重组机会。当经济与金融系统性风险累积到较高的水平，CoCoCb可以按照事先约定的折扣率回售，或者被转换为等价值的普通或有可转债（CoCo）。当债券发行银行陷入财务困境时，CoCo转换为股权以吸收银行的损失，并维持银行正常运营。CoCoCb的回售机制允许银行在经济与金融危机爆发前债务减记，即CoCoCb嵌入了逆周期缓冲机制；债转股机制使得CoCoCb具有很强的损失吸收能力。基于Black-Scholes期权定价模型、Jarrow-Turnbull简约化定价模型和无违约风险假设，利用复制方法求解零息票CoCoCb定价解析式。实证分析表明：信贷与GDP的缺口（Gap）值达到峰值事件服从泊松过程。选取适当的回售比率能保证CoCoCb兼具逆周期缓冲与损失吸收能力。     

股权结构、财务困境成本与困境公司绩效

本文以1997—2003年发生财务困境的105家上市公司为研究样本,以资本支出率度量公司投资水平,以销售增长率与“EBIT/总资产”度量公司绩效,采用单变量与多变量分析方法。研究发现,第一大股东持股比例越大,困境公司的投资与绩效水平越高；股权制衡对困境公司不再具有显著的积极作用；由于预算软约束的存在,国有公司比非国有公司在财务困境期间具有更低的财务困境成本,失去了更少的投资机会、市场份额与利润,从而表现出更高的投资与绩效水平；公司是否被企业集团控制与财务困境成本及困境公司的投资、绩效水平没有显著相关性。     

Implementation of Equity in Resource Allocation for Regional Earthquake Risk Mitigation Using Two‐Stage Stochastic Programming

This article presents a new methodology to implement the concept of equity in regional earthquake risk mitigation programs using an optimization framework. It presents a framework that could be used by decisionmakers (government and authorities) to structure budget allocation strategy toward different seismic risk mitigation measures, i.e., structural retrofitting for different building structural types in different locations and planning horizons. A two‐stage stochastic model is developed here to seek optimal mitigation measures based on minimizing mitigation expenditures, reconstruction expenditures, and especially large losses in highly seismically active countries. To consider fairness in the distribution of financial resources among different groups of people, the equity concept is incorporated using constraints in model formulation. These constraints limit inequity to the user‐defined level to achieve the equity‐efficiency tradeoff in the decision‐making process. To present practical application of the proposed model, it is applied to a pilot area in Tehran, the capital city of Iran. Building stocks, structural vulnerability functions, and regional seismic hazard characteristics are incorporated to compile a probabilistic seismic risk model for the pilot area. Results illustrate the variation of mitigation expenditures by location and structural type for buildings. These expenditures are sensitive to the amount of available budget and equity consideration for the constant risk aversion. Most significantly, equity is more easily achieved if the budget is unlimited. Conversely, increasing equity where the budget is limited decreases the efficiency. The risk‐return tradeoff, equity‐reconstruction expenditures tradeoff, and variation of per‐capita expected earthquake loss in different income classes are also presented.     

KALMAN滤波在财务预算中的应用

本文在棋盘式总帐借货平衡原理的基础上,给出了企业的投人产出关系在财务上的表达形式,并应用KALMAN滤波方法,实现了在总帐基础上的财务预算。