Incentives for information sharing in duopoly with capacity constraints

We study the ex ante incentives for firms to share their private information in a Cournot duopoly with capacity constraints. In both demand and cost information sharing games, we show that the incentives can be reversed when some equilibrium solutions are binding on capacity. Especially, we identify some conditions under which partial information sharing is the dominant strategy under both games. Numerical examples are provided for illustration. In addition, we show that information sharing does not necessarily increase social welfare.     

逆向选择下信息系统的选择标准

逆向选择情形下,代理人拥有的私人信息对委托人与代理人博弈的均衡结果有着至关重要的影响.实际上,逆向选择过程中委托人面临的问题可分为两个阶段:一是对信息系统的选择,二是在给定信息系统下的机制设计问题.现有文献往往关注后一阶段信息系统既定情况下的机制设计问题,本文研究的是第一阶段信息系统的选择标准.在代理人效用函数特定的基础上,当代理人能力的分布函数G(y)一阶随机占优于分布函数F(y),委托人相对于信息系统G(y)更偏好于信息系统F(y),即一阶随机占优(FSD)是逆向选择情形下信息系统占优的充分条件.     

INFORMATION GATHERING IN ORGANIZATIONS: EQUILIBRIUM,WELFARE, AND OPTIMAL NETWORK STRUCTURE

We model an organization as a game in which all agents share a common decision problem and some level of coordination is necessary between individual actions. Agents have individual private information concerning the task they have to perform, and they share this private information through pairwise channels of communication. We analyze how this communication pattern, modeled by means of a network structure, affects individual behavior and aggregate welfare. In the unique equilibrium of this Bayesian game, each agent's optimal action depends on a properly defined knowledge index that measures how the aggregation of information helps him to infer higher‐order beliefs about other's information after communication. Adding communication channels is not always beneficial for the organization because it can lead to mis‐coordination. We single out the geometry of interagent communication links that the manager could implement in order to improve the organization's performance.     

考虑消费者策略行为的供应链两周期定价与契约设计

针对由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的供应链,考虑消费者的策略性跨期购买行为,构建了两周期动态博弈模型,分析了消费者策略性程度对两周期均衡结果、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,比较了分散式与集中式决策的均衡偏差,设计了与消费者策略性程度相关的两周期收益共享契约与"两周期收益共享+转移支付"组合式契约。研究表明：分散式决策下,消费者策略性程度有利于增加消费者剩余和社会福利,但会对供应链成员不利;某些情形下,消费者策略性程度会使分散式与集中式决策的系统利润差值增大;当消费者策略性程度相对较低时,两周期收益共享契约不仅可实现供应链完美协调,还可增加消费者剩余和社会福利;当消费者策略性程度较高时,通过组合式契约可实现供应链完美协调,但此时消费者策略性程度的增强可能对消费者剩余和社会福利产生负面影响。     

政府奖惩下闭环供应链中需求预测信息分享研究

考虑政府奖惩机制，在制造商直接回收的闭环供应链中，当市场不确定且制造商和零售商都能预测需求时，为研究零售商的需求预测信息分享问题，本文构建一个Stackelberg博弈模型，分别求得零售商信息分享和不分享情形下的均衡结果，探讨了需求预测信息精度对供应链成员利润及信息分享价值的影响，并研究了供应链均衡的信息分享策略。研究发现，需求预测精度的提高在大多数情形下会使供应链成员都受益。当制造商回收效率较高时，自愿分享需求信息是一个均衡；当制造商回收效率较低时，信息不分享是一个均衡；当制造商回收效率处于中等水平时，通过设计一个讨价还价机制，可以促使信息分享是一个均衡。此外，政府奖惩力度也会影响均衡的信息分享策略。     

CREDIT,WAGES, AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS

We analyze how bankruptcy laws affect the general equilibrium interactions between credit and wages. Soft laws reduce the frequency of liquidations and thus ex post inefficiencies, but they worsen credit rationing ex ante. This hinders firm creation and thus depresses labor demand. Rich agents who need few outside funds can invest even if creditor rights are weak. Hence, they favor soft laws that exclude poorer agents from the credit market and reduce the competition for labor. Such laws can generate greater utilitarian welfare than under perfect contract enforcement: By barring access to credit to some agents, soft laws lower wages, which increases the pledgeable income of richer agents and decreases the liquidation rates they must commit to. When they induce strong credit rationing, however, soft laws are Pareto‐dominated by tougher laws combined with subsidies to entrepreneurs. (JEL: D82, G33, K22)     

平台竞争、排他性协议与竞争瓶颈

在很多双边市场中，经常出现平台一边的用户与平台之间产生利益纠纷的现象，例如顺丰速运与菜鸟网络之间的纠纷等，本文从理论模型的角度研究了这种经济现象。文章通过将双边市场的用户分为视平台有差异和无差异两种类型，研究了平台如何掠夺视平台无差异的用户所有剩余的问题。研究发现，平台厂商有与视平台无差异的用户签订排他性协议的激励；无论签订排他性协议与否，这类用户都将被掠夺所有剩余，产生了所谓的"竞争瓶颈"；排他性协议带来的福利效应并不明确，当平台的边际成本和交叉外部性参数较大时，排他性协议的签订能够提升社会总福利。     

技术赋能、用户规模与共享经济社会福利

以Airbnb和Uber为代表的共享经济业态已成为学术界关注热点，但当前研究侧重于商业模式，而忽视了凸显其"普惠"本质的社会福利分析。基于共享经济市场结构演进的三个典型阶段，本文构建理论模型刻画了技术赋能、用户规模与社会福利之间的内在关系。研究发现：在起步阶段，市场处于局部垄断状态，此时共享经济社会福利存在损失，且福利水平主要取决于技术赋能；在发展阶段，各个共享经济平台的市场范围产生重叠，平台企业间扩张用户规模的竞争将提升社会福利；在成熟阶段，平台间并购而形成"竞争性垄断"市场结构，此时社会福利可能再次得到提升。进一步的模型分析揭示了其内在机理：技术赋能对社会福利具有"替代"和"挖掘"的双重效应，而用户规模则对社会福利产生了"正负"两方面的外部性影响。本文为共享经济的平台战略和政府规制提供了有益指导。     

绿色供应链中不对称需求预测下的信息共享研究

研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链和他们的需求预测信息共享问题。考虑了两种方案：订货型生产方案和库存型生产方案，两种方案下分别考虑了无信息共享和信息共享两种情况。分析了预测信息对两种方案下制造商利润、零售商利润和信息共享价值的影响，同时研究了绿色成本系数对信息共享的影响。研究表明，两种方案中制造商始终能从信息共享中获利，而零售商只有在制造商绿色成本系数较低时才会自愿共享预测信息。当绿色成本系数较高时，制造商可以通过一个讨价还价合同，促进零售商进行信息共享。当绿色成本系数很高时，供应链成员之间不存在信息共享。此外，库存型生产方案中信息共享带来的总收益增量要高于订货型生产方案，因此，库存型生产方案中参与者信息共享的可能性要高于订货型生产方案。     

INFORMATION SHARING IN COMMON AGENCY: WHEN IS TRANSPARENCY GOOD?

When should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about the agent's unobservable effort for producing a public good? In a model with two principals who offer linear incentive schemes, we show that information sharing always increases total expected welfare if the principal who is less informed about the agent's effort also cares more about the agent's output. If the less‐informed principal cares somewhat (but not too much) less than the other principal about the agent's output, information sharing reduces total expected welfare. In our model the efficient information regime emerges as an equilibrium outcome. (JEL: D82, D86, M52)     

供应链中具有产能限制的竞争企业中的信息共享研究

本文研究由一个供货商和两个制造商组成的二级供应链中，制造商之间的横向信息共享策略和供应商的定价问题。在模型中，上游供应商同时为下游两家制造商提供价格相同的原材料，下游制造商生产具有替代性的商品进行数量竞争，并受到相同的产能限制。以Cournot博弈为研究手段，求解了制造商的均衡订货决策和信息共享策略，分析比较了在不同的信息共享策略下制造商的利润、供应商的利润和批发价格。本文在研究制造商的信息共享策略时考虑了上游供应商的批发价格的影响。研究表明，当均衡解受到产能约束时，制造商的信息共享策略会反向。在某些情况下，完全信息共享和完全信息不共享都可能成为博弈的占优策略。上游供应商通过调整批发价格可以影响制造商的信息共享决策。该模型为上游供应商提供了一种最优定价策略，也为下游制造商提供了求解自身最优订货量和信息共享决策的方法。     

基于策略性竞争博弈的供应链信息共享策略

在供应链成员的市场信息以及成本非对称的情形下，讨论两个终端企业（一个自产自销，一个从上游批发产品），在供应链中信息共享策略的方案，包括：信息优势企业如何根据市场需求情况确定是否信息共享（若是，则如何共享）；信息劣势企业如何根据对方透露出的市场信息来决策订货量；上游供应链如何决策批发价，从而控制整个供应链的博弈态势，使下游销售商在竞争中更为主动。经过研究发现，低市场类型时，自产自销商乐于共享信息，使竞争对手摄于低迷的市场状况从而降低订货量；在高市场类型且市场波动较小时自产自销商依然选择共享，在乐观的市场条件下表明自己的竞争优势，从而一定程度上威摄入侵者；而市场波动较大时，由于信息共享的额外收益不足以抵消信息共享需付出的额外成本，从而选择不共享信息。     

Over‐the‐Counter Markets

We study how intermediation and asset prices in over‐the‐counter markets are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargaining. We compute explicitly the prices at which investors trade with each other, as well as marketmakers' bid and ask prices, in a dynamic model with strategic agents. Bid–ask spreads are lower if investors can more easily find other investors or have easier access to multiple marketmakers. With a monopolistic marketmaker, bid–ask spreads are higher if investors have easier access to the marketmaker. We characterize endogenous search and welfare, and discuss empirical implications.     

Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search,Matching, and Endogenous Contact Rates

Building upon a continuous‐time model of search with Nash bargaining in a stationary environment, we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare. Although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model, they can be welfare‐improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market. We discuss identification of the model using Current Population Survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations, and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters. We show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic.     

TRUST,COORDINATION, AND THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a “low‐trust” regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation provided by others' activism; conversely, the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure. When ideological distance is large, a “high‐trust” regime prevails: lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers, and the policymaker's response threshold is correspondingly lower. Within some intermediate range, both equilibria coexist. We then study the optimal organization of influence activities, contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate. (JEL: D72, D78, D82)     

The Economic Value of Market Information for Farmers in Developing Economies

In developing countries, farmers lack information for making informed production, manufacturing/selling decisions to improve their earnings. To alleviate poverty, various non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) and for‐profit companies have developed different ways to distribute information about market price, crop advisory and farming technique to farmers. We investigate a fundamental question: will information create economic value for farmers? We construct a stylized model in which farmers face an uncertain market price (demand) and must make production decisions before the market price is realized. Each farmer has an imprecise private signal and an imprecise public signal to estimate the actual market price. By examining the equilibrium outcomes associated with a Cournot competition game, we show that private signals do create value by improving farmers' welfare. However, this value deteriorates as the public signal becomes available (or more precise). In contrast, in the presence of private signals, the public signal does not always create value for the farmers. Nevertheless, both private and public signals will reduce price variation. We also consider two separate extensions that involve non‐identical private signal precisions and farmers' risk‐aversion, and we find that the same results continue to hold. More importantly, we find that the public signal can reduce welfare inequality when farmers have non‐identical private signal precisions. Also, risk‐aversion can dampen the value created by private or public information.     

基于信任的供应预测信息共享策略

现实中供应不确定是比较普遍的现象，供应预测信息共享对改善供应链绩效起着重要作用。针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的单周期供应链，利用斯坦克尔伯格博弈方法研究信任对供应预测信息共享的影响以及回购契约对该供应链的协调作用。研究表明：零售商对制造商的信任影响供应预测信息共享效果，进而影响供应链绩效；制造商说谎的心理负效用系数越大，越倾向于说真话；回购契约可以促进制造商共享真实供应预测信息；当制造商说谎的心理负效用系数较大时，存在一个最佳的回购价格，使供应链实现完美协调。     

Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains

This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study.     

Optimal pricing strategy of an on-demand platform with cross-regional passengers

Recent years have witnessed the emergence and prosperity of online ride-hailing, which empowers the traditional taxi industry with information technology. However, the ride-hailing platform has no direct control over drivers, one of the biggest challenges for the platform is how to balance the supply and the demand. Considering the cross-regional demand and the surge demand, this paper focuses on the pricing strategy of the ride-hailing platform, and further introduces strategies such as bonus incentive and information sharing. We find that when facing demand surging and supply shortage in one region, the platform can adopt surge pricing or bonus incentive in the adjacent region before the demand surges to balance the supply and the demand. Specially, the surge pricing strategy benefits the platform when the surge demand is high or the cross-regional demand is low, but the bonus incentive strategy has the opposite effect. The existence of cross-regional demand improves the performance of the bonus incentive strategy but reduces that of the surge pricing strategy. We further show that the platform prefers bonus incentive to surge pricing when only a small number of drivers are required to move. But bonus incentive always improves social welfare better than surge pricing. Extending to information asymmetry, information sharing can also encourage more drivers to move. However, the effect is limited such that the proportion of drivers who move will not exceed a threshold. The platform also has the incentive to share false information, which makes drivers question the credibility of the shared information. In this case, the surge pricing strategy can be used as a costly signal to verify the credibility of the information.     

Outsourcing Competition and Information Sharing with Asymmetrically Informed Suppliers

This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms.