沟通技术和时间因素对虚拟团队过程影响实验研究

以学生为实验对象,进行由48个3人组参与的2×2因子实验,对不同技术条件和团队发展阶段下的虚拟团队进行模拟.通过时实验对象的问卷调查,收集贫瘠和丰富沟通技术条件下虚拟团队在早期阶段和后期阶段的信任水平、冲突水平和绩效水平数据,并以此分析两类沟通技术在虚拟团队发展的不同阶段对团队内冲突和信任水平的影响以及虚拟团队过程中信任的调节作用和绩效的反馈作用.研究结果表明,在虚拟团队发展的早期阶段,丰富度高的沟通技术会引发更多的关系冲突,不利于团队信任的建立,并且在促使成员积极讨论任务方面的优势并不明显;在虚拟团队发展的后期阶段,团队中的信任和冲突水平受到前期绩效的反馈作用和技术变更的影响,早期绩效对后期团队内冲突和信任具有显著的反馈作用,技术变更带来关系冲突水平的增加,而沟通技术在后期阶段将不再是影响团队内信任和冲突的主要因素;信任的调节作用在虚拟情境下得到验证.     

基于1996~2020年文献计量分析的团队冲突管理研究知识图谱与热点趋势研究

以1996~2020年Web of Science核心合集数据库中团队冲突在管理学研究中的文献为研究对象,运用Citespace等可视化科学工具绘制了团队冲突研究关键词共现图谱和战略坐标图,系统分析了团队冲突管理研究内容的内在关联与发展脉络,并绘制了团队冲突管理研究的热点趋势主线框架。研究结果发现:团队内部冲突、信任、绩效、战略性决策是团队冲突管理研究的热点。在未来的研究中,探究不同类型冲突间的转化过程及边界条件是明晰团队冲突结构及作用机制的突破口;结合其他冲突类型及团队生命周期各阶段展开对团队冲突与绩效影响关系的讨论是对团队冲突影响结果的有益探索;辨识高层管理团队成员间的信任障碍问题、虚拟团队中的快速信任机制是信任与冲突关系研究的重点议题;探究不同冲突管理策略组合运用的作用机理是找到冲突解决方案的关键一环。     

团队冲突、冲突管理与绩效关系的实证研究

在组织研究领域,冲突一直被视为重要的团队交互过程变量.然而.关于团队冲突与绩效的关系存在很多争议,且以往的研究很少同时考虑团队冲突和冲突管理行为,这就忽视了冲突管理对团队冲突的潜在引导作用.通过对76个工作团队的冲突、冲突管理行为和绩效的实证研究,发现冲突管理和冲突的交互作用对团队绩效的影响显著.竞争型冲突管理行为会导致关系冲突的增加,进而导致团队绩效的降低;回避型冲突管理行为和关系冲突显著负相关;任务冲突与团队绩效之间显著正相关.本文的研究结果对于企业管理人员发挥任务冲突的正面效用、降低关系冲突的负面影响有一定的启示.     

团队内冲突对团队决策质量和满意度影响的实证研究

冲突是影响团队决策绩效的重要变量。本文在总结了近年来国内外团队冲突研究成果的基础上,研究中国文化背景下的不同类型冲突对团队决策质量认知和满意度的影响。通过对156名企业管理人员的问卷调查,发现中国企业管理人员对团队内冲突同样可以区分为关系冲突和任务冲突两个维度,两种冲突都对决策满意度有负面影响,其中关系冲突对于任务冲突和决策满意度有中介作用。     

团队情绪智力对团队冲突及管理风格影响研究——基于企业高层管理团队的实证分析

文章以企业高层管理团队为对象,实证研究了团队情绪智力与整个管理团队冲突及冲突管理风格之间的关系,并验证了团队情绪智力在团队认知冲突与情感冲突之间的中介效应。研究结果表明,团队情绪智力显著影响团队情感冲突,对于认知冲突与情感冲突的关系起部分中介作用;团队情绪智力与协调型冲突管理风格显著正相关。     

抑制团队关系冲突的负效应:一项中国情境的研究

团队是组织工作的基本单位。团队工作要达其功效,不仅要求团队成员间交流信息,而且需要深度加工信息。但是,现实中团队关系冲突是常态,在讲究面子、圈子和关系的中国社会,关系冲突表现为圈子间的芥蒂与隔阂,极大阻碍了团队内信息深度加工。基于中国情境,本研究引入两个相关的概念——中庸思维和领导成员交换关系——来抑制团队关系冲突对团队内信息深度加工的负作用。来自31家高新技术企业59个研发团队的405位团队员工和主管的数据证实:当团队成员中庸思维总体水平高时,关系冲突对信息深度加工的负效应被显著地抑制;当团队成员感知到的领导成员交换关系总体水平高时,该负效应也被显著地抑制。理论上,本研究不仅深化了对团队冲突过程的认知,而且拓展了理论的应用边界;实践上,为现实的团队关系冲突管理提供了情境相关的理论指导。     

项目团队与建设

团队建设是发展培养团队成员实现项目目标,是项目经理和项目团队的共同职责.项目工作中冲突是不可避免的,特别是成员之间的冲突,如何积极有效的进行解决是项目团队建设中尤为值得注意的事项.本文通过对现有国企体制改革中由于人员精简而带来人员之间的冲突进行剖析,探讨解决冲突的方法.指出团队建设是项目成败的关键.     

领导—成员交换差异与团队关系冲突:道德型领导力的调节作用

基于领导—成员交换(Leader-Member Exchange,LMX)理论和社会比较理论(Social Comparison Theory),本文对领导—成员交换差异与团队关系冲突之间的关系进行了实证研究.研究从领导者角度探讨了团队关系冲突的影响因素.来自79个项目团队的334名员工构成了本研究的样本,实证检验结果表明,领导—成员交换差异对团队关系冲突有显著正向影响,且团队领导者的道德型领导力在领导—成员交换差异与团队关系冲突之间起调节作用,即相对于较低的道德型领导力,较高的道德型领导力可以缓解领导—成员交换差异对团队关系冲突的影响.     

领导团队的情感冲突与管理之方

领导团队情感冲突会影响团队的任务绩效,形成糟糕的团队氛围,并使得决策质量降低,因此必须对领导团队情感冲突进行合理管控。可以从加强团队沟通、构建团队信任、建立开放性的团队规范以及采取合理的冲突管理策略等方面着力,尽量减少情感冲突的破坏性。     

投资者与创始人的争斗:冲突来源及演化路径——基于我国公司公开冲突事件的案例分析

本文以17家风险投资者和企业创始人公开冲突事件的媒体报道为研究样本,采用文本分析方法,对冲突来源、冲突类型及具体表现形式,以及冲突演化路径进行了实证研究。结果表明,我国企业的风险投资者和创始人的冲突来源于利益分歧下的控制权冲突、战略目标冲突和收益分配冲突,以及组织内部分歧下的制度与创业文化冲突、管理冲突和关系冲突。并且,利益冲突和组织内部冲突并不是独立的,而是相互关联的。当投资者和创始人双方沟通不畅或信任缺失时,利益冲突会衍生或加剧组织内部冲突。     

Dynamic Identification of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models

This paper studies dynamic identification of parameters of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model from the first and second moments of the data. Classical results for dynamic simultaneous equations do not apply because the state space solution of the model does not constitute a standard reduced form. Full rank of the Jacobian matrix of derivatives of the solution parameters with respect to the parameters of interest is necessary but not sufficient for identification. We use restrictions implied by observational equivalence to obtain two sets of rank and order conditions: one for stochastically singular models and another for nonsingular models. Measurement errors, mean, long‐run, and a priori restrictions can be accommodated. An example is considered to illustrate the results.     

利益群体的动态合作竞争

本文通过建立一个描述利益群体相互作用的微分动力模型,讨论了其均衡解的存在和稳定性条件.并利用该模型的离散形式探讨了合作子系统成员的识别模式以及联盟块的集成;也提及了联盟块个数递减乃至最终一体化的可能路径.     

Dynamic Female Labor Supply

The increase in female employment and participation rates is one of the most dramatic changes to have taken place in the economy during the last century. However, while the employment rate of married women more than doubled during the last 50 years, that of unmarried women remained almost constant. To empirically analyze these trends, we estimate a female dynamic labor supply model using an extended version of Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) to compare the various explanations in the literature for the observed trends. This dynamic model provides a much better fit to the life‐cycle employment pattern than a static version of the model and a standard static reduced form model (Heckman (1979)). The main finding using the dynamic model is that the rise in education levels accounts for about 33 percent of the increase in female employment, and the rise in wages and narrowing of the gender wage gap account for another 20 percent, while about 40 percent remains unexplained by observed household characteristics. We show that this unexplained portion can be empirically attributed to cohort‐specific changes in preferences or the costs of child‐rearing and household maintenance. Finally, the decline in fertility and the increase in divorce rates account for only a small share of the increase in female employment rates.     

An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism

This paper constructs an efficient, budget‐balanced, Bayesian incentive‐compatible mechanism for a general dynamic environment with quasilinear payoffs in which agents observe private information and decisions are made over countably many periods. First, under the assumption of “private values” (other agents' private information does not directly affect an agent's payoffs), we construct an efficient, ex post incentive‐compatible mechanism, which is not budget‐balanced. Second, under the assumption of “independent types” (the distribution of each agent's private information is not directly affected by other agents' private information), we show how the budget can be balanced without compromising agents' incentives. Finally, we show that the mechanism can be made self‐enforcing when agents are sufficiently patient and the induced stochastic process over types is an ergodic finite Markov chain.     

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private‐value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex post incentive, ex post participation, and efficient exit conditions. We develop the dynamic pivot mechanism in detail for a repeated auction of a single object in which each bidder learns over time her true valuation of the object. The dynamic pivot mechanism here is equivalent to a modified second price auction.     

投入产出模型的动态化

建立合理、实用的动态投入产出模型,一直是投入产出理论研究的重要课题。本文把静态列昂节夫投入产出模型和宏观经济学的收入决定理论结合起来,得到一个基于变结构控制的动态投入产出模型。     

Dynamic Preference for Flexibility

We consider a decision maker who faces dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal trade‐offs, as in consumption–savings problems, and who experiences taste shocks that are transient contingent on the state of the world. We axiomatize a recursive representation of choice over state contingent infinite horizon consumption problems, where uncertainty about consumption utilities depends on the observable state and the state follows a subjective Markov process. The parameters of the representation are the subjective process that governs the evolution of beliefs over consumption utilities and the discount factor; they are uniquely identified from behavior. We characterize a natural notion of greater preference for flexibility in terms of a dilation of beliefs. An important special case of our representation is a recursive version of the Anscombe–Aumann model with parameters that include a subjective Markov process over states and state‐dependent utilities, all of which are uniquely identified.     

团队生产动态博弈

本文建立了团队生产动态(微分 )博弈模型,用Pontryagin最大值原理和共轭点理论研究了该微分博弈的Nash均衡存在的充分必要条件。我们也讨论协调个人理性和集体理性的促进团队合作博弈的机制设置问题。     

Dynamic pricing with strategic customers

This paper provides an overview of the literature on dynamic pricing with strategic customers. In the past, research on dynamic pricing was mostly concerned with optimally pricing products over time in a market with myopic customers. In recent years, the consideration of strategic customers, who can delay a purchase to take advantage of a future discount, has dramatically increased. This paper’s main contribution is the development of a comprehensive classification scheme to structure the field of research and, based upon this, a systematic overview of all relevant papers. We then present in detail the various aspects considered in the literature together with their motivation from industry and state the major findings of the most relevant papers. Further attention is given to important problem extensions proposed in the literature that have been considered in only a few papers and are usually motivated by specific practical applications. Finally, promising directions for future research are indicated.     

动态报表实现技术

以高等学校统计报表管理系统为应用背景,介绍了如何利用动态数据库技术和自己开发的报表控件,针对报表数据工作流,实现各种复杂报表的设计、管理、查询等功能,使应用程序能较好地适应应用环境的变化.