Pro forma earnings disclosure: the effects of non-GAAP earnings and earnings-before on investors’ information processing

Research on pro forma earnings disclosure usually does not distinguish between different types of pro forma earnings. However, non-GAAP earnings and earnings-before (EB) metrics such as the EBIT fit the conventional perception of pro forma earnings but offer varying degrees of flexibility to management in pursuing strategic reporting motives. This study presents the results of an experiment that builds upon Maines and McDaniel’s (Account Rev 75(2):179–207, 2000) framework and analyzes if variations in the use and combination of pro forma earnings information affect whether nonprofessional investors acquire (pro forma) earnings information, and how this information is evaluated, and weighted when making investment-related judgments. Our results indicate that a “pure” non-GAAP disclosure increases investors’ evaluation of a company’s earnings performance compared to all other reporting strategies. However, we also find that nonprofessional investors consider non-GAAP information strategically motivated and thus weight it less heavily in arriving at investment-related judgments. Overall, we find that investors’ judgments (i.e., the overall favorability of the earnings announcement and the company’s attractiveness as an investment) are highest when the earnings press release contains the non-GAAP earnings and the EB measure. This has important implications for behavioral accounting theory as well as corporate practice and policy-making.     

Einfluss der Mandatsdauer des Abschlussprüfers auf ergebniszielgr??enorientierte Bilanzpolitik

This study examines whether the length of auditor-client-relationship affects audit quality. It is motivated by recent calls for mandatory auditor rotation in Europe which are based on concerns that a longer auditor tenure reduces audit quality. Earnings management is used as proxy for audit quality. It is measured by the firms’ success to achieve earnings benchmark targets. A situation in which an abnormal high proportion of firms just meet the benchmark and an abnormal low proportion of firms just miss the benchmark is interpreted as earnings management. Analysed benchmark targets are the reporting of small profits (loss avoidance) and the reporting of small positive earnings increases. Multivariate analyses indicate a higher success for benchmark beating with longer auditor tenure. This result suggests that, in the current environment, mandatory limitations on the length of auditor-client-relationship could result in higher audit quality.     

我国企业集团上市公司关联交易频率特征分析

现有的研究表明,关联交易是产生企业集团信用风险的重要因素之一。因此,对关联交易的分析是商业银行防范企业集团信用风险的重要工作。但是,目前还缺乏对关联交易定量化的研究。根据CCER数据库定义的29个关联交易类别,在2002-2006年上市企业集团公司的关联交易数据基础上,分析企业集团关联交易类别和频率特征,以及它们与企业集团信用风险的逻辑关系。统计分析显示,企业集团每年的关联交易频率符合负二项分布,并解释了负二项分布参数的实际意义。案例分析表明太多或太少的关联交易次数,都说明企业集团的经营存在问题,从而将直接或间接地增大其信用风险。     

Related party transactions under a contingency perspective

Related party transactions (RPTs) are transfers of resources, services or obligations between a reporting entity and a related party (IASB 2009); criteria for a related party definition may significantly differ among the various accounting and governance academic studies and regulatory principles, but they usually depend upon the ability to influ-ence contractual terms and conditions. The topic has been neglected for a long time. In the literature two theories prevail: (a) conflict of interests, considering these dealings as potentially harmful and carried out in the interest of directors; (b) efficient transaction hypothesis, describing them as sound economic exchanges. The paper examines both theories critically through a deductive approach, and also on the basis of their economic rationale. Then, a contingency perspective is suggested, underling how the effectiveness and the efficiency of the proposed solutions are strictly correlated to organizational contexts, institutional environments and governance practices. The study is largely based on a literature review and has different purposes: (a) to shed light on a topic, that, despite its potential impact, has not yet deserved great attention in governance studies; (b) to stress possible inconsistencies in the above mentioned theories, both, to some extent, ideologically biased and unable to offer a proper picture of these heterogeneous dealings; (c) to suggest a more balanced and pragmatic approach, less influ-enced by a suspicious attitude (typical of the conflict of interests theory), possibly more consistent with their economic rationale (as suggested by the efficient transactions hypothesis) as well as social fac-tors and governance practices.     

Related party transactions and audit fees: the role of the internal audit function

Related party transactions (RPTs) are viewed as genuine transactions that rationally fulfil other economic demands of a company. However, RPTs can also be used to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders. The existence of such transactions may deteriorate financial reporting quality, increase audit risk, and as a result increase audit fees. This study examines the relationship between RPTs and audit fees in Malaysia, where ownership is often concentrated within a controlling family and corporate governance mechanisms are poor. It also investigates the moderating effect of the internal audit function (IAF) on this relationship. We find that external auditors base their fees on the types of RPTs undertaken. Specifically, our results show that audit fees are higher for firms that undertake RPTs involving the sale and purchase of assets, goods, and services. We also document that external auditors rely on the IAF, and thus their fees are lower for firms that undertake RPTs and that have made a large investment in an IAF. Our study is the first to provide evidence that RPTs in Malaysian firms may be abused as a channel to facilitate tunnelling and that the IAF plays a vital role in controlling such transactions.     

Pre‐Going Private Ownership Around the World

Going private transactions are often highly leveraged, and give rise to potential agency conflicts among existing shareholders. But who exactly are those shareholders, and under what legal conditions are these transactions more likely to occur? We examine ownership structure prior to going private transactions in 33 countries around the world from 2002 to 2014. The data indicate strong and consistent evidence that pre‐going private ownership is characterized by higher institutional and corporate ownership. Family ownership lowers the probability of a public to private transaction. Stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private, particularly for whole company and institutional buyouts.     

Management’s causal reasoning on performance and earnings management

We investigate the association between the intensity of causal reasoning on performance in a firm’s annual management commentary and its earnings management propensity. Anticipated earnings management concerns are argued to constitute a significant accountability predicament, bringing management to offer more intense causal reasoning in order to mitigate investors’ earnings management concerns. We use computer-intensive techniques to measure causal reasoning intensity as a generic disclosure quality in the management commentary of a large sample of US firms from 1999 to 2007. We find that accruals earnings management (signed discretionary accruals) is positively associated with causal reasoning intensity. The positive association holds for alternative specifications of accruals earnings management (an earnings management dummy model and an analyst expectations model) and in a change model. Our results are consistent with the assertion that firms strategically use causal reasoning on performance to establish appropriateness and cognitive legitimacy, increase perceived plausibility of reported performance and mitigate performance-related concerns of investors.     

中国上市公司审计委员会治理效率的实证研究

国外机构以及相关学者的研究认为,审计委员会应在监督财务报告、管理内部审计、审核内部控制制度等方面发挥作用,中国证监会还特别强调除此以外的对公司重大关联交易事项的审计。本文以对中国上市公司审计委员会的调查为依据,对审计委员会的治理效率进行了系统的实证观察。结果显示,我国上市公司审计委员会在维护信息披露的质量方面起到了一定的积极作用;但在防止上市公司财务舞弊、维护关联交易的规范性以及确保上市公司财务安全性等方面没有发挥显著作用。目前上市公司审计委员会的设置是外部制度约束的结果。     

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

We provide evidence that long‐term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long‐term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third‐party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long‐term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one‐shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner.     

The Phenomenology of Earnings Management within the Confines of Agency Theory

Agents' selective and acceptable reporting of economic events by different accounting systems, compounded by alternative accounting methods and estimates, make financial statements an approximation of economic reality. The tendency to delay accounting recognition of some transactions suggests that financial statements lag behind reality. The difference between reality and imaginary is often referred to as the agency problem. An essential characteristic of this problem is risk attitudes of principals (shareholders) and agents (management). Shareholders are considered risk neutral in their preferences for individual firms. They are in a position to diversify their shareholdings across multiple firms. Agents on the other hand have security and income that are inextricably linked to one firm. It would not be surprising to find agents exhibiting risk aversion in decisions regarding the firm. Immediately one's attention is drawn to the opportunity costs that arise for the risk-neutral shareholders who prefer that agents maximize their returns. The risk differential between agents and principals creates a problem in principal-agent relationship. It is within this framework that supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk orientation of agents are set up. Powerful incentives act upon agents as they exercise their judgment, particularly when the judgment can trigger a stock market response that will, in turn, affect the firm in numerous ways. The responsibility of agents is to manage earnings. From a principal's perspective not all of the methods used to achieve this goal are equally desirable. Agents can either increase productivity or they can strategically manipulate accounting choices to affect earnings. The latter method need not come with any associated changes in productivity. Consequently, there is misstatement of the financial results and position. The calculus of earnings management is considered within the confines of agents' treatment of risk. Using an Agency Theory framework, this study examines the techniques used by agents to manage and manipulate earnings. The study initially tests the hypothesis whether earnings are really managed. For this purpose two manipulation indices were developed and based upon these indices the phenomenology earnings management was considered.     

管理层股权激励与企业未来盈余定价——来自中国资本市场的证据

本文探讨管理层股权激励对企业未来盈余定价的影响,并进一步将企业未来盈余分解为行业成分和公司特质成分,考察股权激励对不同成分未来盈余定价的影响,以及不同模式股权激励对上述关系影响的差异。利用实施股权激励的中国A股上市公司2006-2016年间的数据,本文发现：（1）股权激励提高了当期股票收益率与企业未来盈余的相关性。说明管理层股权激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价;（2）管理层股权激励并不影响投资者对行业成分未来盈余定价,但会加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价;（3）管理层的股票型激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价,同时也能加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价,但股票期权激励并无上述作用。研究结果意味着,整体而言股权激励能够缓解管理层与股东之间信息披露的代理问题,激励管理层向外部投资者披露更多高质量的公司基本面信息,从而降低投资者对公司特质未来盈余信息的搜寻成本,最终通过加速公司特质未来盈余信息融入股价来促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价。本文揭示了管理层股权激励促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价的微观机制,同时,研究结论对提高中国证券市场的信息效率提供了重要的理论参考。     

Corporate social responsibility disclosure and market valuation: evidence from Spanish listed firms

Using a sample of listed Spanish companies pertaining to the IBEX35 index for the period 2007–2011, this paper examines whether those firms with higher CSR disclosure ratings are more valued by market participants. This study also complements the literature addressing the value relevance of CSR disclosure by further analyzing not only the direct effects of CSR reporting on stock prices but also its indirect effects through its interaction with main accounting variables (i.e., earnings and book value of equity). CSR reports can also affect stock price indirectly because the sustainability report may be perceived by investors to be a source of further and complementary information regarding the nature, composition and trends of the traditional value-relevant accounting variables. Finally, this study also analyzes whether CSR disclosure by firms operating in environmentally-sensitive industries is assessed differently by market participants than CSR disclosure by companies operating in other industries. By using a modified Ohlson (Contemp Account Res 1:661–687, 1995) model, it is found that CSR disclosure do have both a direct and indirect effect on stock prices by modifying the value-relevance of earnings and book value of equity. Moreover, CSR disclosure by companies operating in environmentally-sensitive industries is associated with higher market valuations than CSR disclosure by companies operating in nonsensitive industries. This may be due to the fact that CSR disclosures provide information that allow investors to make better assessments of the increased risk related to potential litigation and future environmental liabilities, thereby reducing information asymmetries and the risk of adverse selection.     

控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究

本文分析控股股东是否通过关联交易,转移上市公司资源、侵占小股东利益.对中国上市公司1999-2001年的关联交易的实证检验结果发现:由控股股东控制的公司,其关联交易显著高于无控股股东控制的公司;控股股东担任高级管理者的公司,其关联交易显著高于控股股东不担任高级管理者的公司;控股股东持股比例和控股股东在董事会中的席位比例越高,关联交易越多,这意味着控股股东确实能够借助关联交易转移公司资源、侵占小股东利益.     

信息环境、年报披露时间选择与下年盈余管理

年报披露时间是否有助于投资者合理估计下年盈余管理程度,不同信息环境对这种估计又有什么影响?本文利用2004-2006年间的3451家公司样本对此进行了检验.结果表明:年报披露时间与下年盈余管理负相关,年报披露时间能向市场传递有效的未来信号;在标准审计意见和有较高质量经营现金流量支持的信息环境下,年报披露时间选择对下年盈余管理的信号作用更强.这些结论对理解公司年报披露时间安排有一定积极意义.     

盈余质量对资本配置效率的影响及作用机理

本文以2004-2007年沪深两市的上市公司为研究样本,在Richardson、verdi研究的基础上,对中国现实制度背景下盈余质量和资本配置效率两者的关系进行了探讨.不同于国内外的现有研究,本文不仅检验了盈余质量是否影响上市公司的资本配置效率,还对盈余质量如何影响上市公司资本配置效率进行了检验.检验结果表明,盈余质量的改善一方面能直接提高上市公司的资本配置效率,另一方面则能够通过降低代理成本间接促进上市公司资本配置效率的提高.这一研究结论对理解盈余质量在上市公司资本配置效率中的作用,以及了解盈余质量与上市公司资本配置效率之间的中介传导机制和路径模式均具有较强的现实意义.     

家族董事席位超额控制与股价崩盘风险——基于关联交易的视角

本文基于关联交易的视角,以2008-2017年沪深A股上市家族企业为研究对象,考察了家族董事席位超额控制程度与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。研究发现,家族董事席位超额控制程度与企业的股价崩盘风险、控股家族的关联交易行为正相关;同时,控股家族的关联交易行为对企业股价崩盘风险有显著的正向影响,并且这种影响在家族董事席位超额控程度较高的公司中更为明显。进一步分析发现,机构持股比例较低、两职合一、董事会规模较小时,家族董事席位超额控制程度与企业的股价崩盘风险、控股家族的关联交易规模之间的正相关性更强;控股家族的关联交易规模对企业股价崩盘风险的正向影响更显著,其与家族董事席位超额控制程度的交互关系对股价崩盘风险的正向影响更明显。最后,控制潜在的内生性问题,并进行一系列的稳健性检验后,研究结论依然成立。本文不仅从关联交易的视角探讨了家族董事席位超额控制对资本市场的影响,也为家族企业股价崩盘风险的成因提供了更多的理论解释。     

The impact of managerial political ties on corporate governance and debt financing: Evidence from Ghana

In this study, we draw upon insights from agency theory to examine the impact of managerial political ties on cost of debt and also to explore whether corporate governance mediates this impact. We hypothesize that political ties reduce financial reporting quality, disclosure of non-financial information and board independence, and are therefore associated with higher interest rates. We also hypothesize that the negative effect of political ties on the cost of debt will be stronger if firms borrow from privately-owned banks versus government-owned banks. Using data from Ghana, we find support for our direct and moderation hypotheses; political ties are associated with high interest rates and poor corporate governance. However, we do not find evidence of mediation. Altogether, the findings reveal the dark side of political connections and highlight the cost of political embeddedness in emerging credit markets.     

External audit and goodwill write-off

Building on agency theory, we investigate whether and how salient external auditor characteristics (size, audit fees, non-audit fees, tenure) impact on the reported goodwill write-off. We use a sample of US firms applying SFAS 142. We find that Big-4 auditors are more prone to limit underestimated write-offs rather than overestimated write-offs and that auditors require higher fees from companies underestimating the write-offs. The findings are consistent with the auditors’ preference for more conservative goodwill and earnings values, which reduce their litigation and reputation costs. This preference can converge with the managerial interest to use unnecessary overestimated goodwill write-offs for earnings management purposes (e.g. to smooth the income or take big baths). Our findings do not support the hypotheses that non-audit fees and tenure affect the goodwill write-off. Our paper contributes to prior literature on external audit and financial accounting choices. Our study suggests that leniently audited discretional fair value estimates are likely to compromise the role of auditing (and of financial reporting) as an external control mechanism. Our study can contribute to the current policy debate around goodwill accounting.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS WITH ENFORCEMENT RISK

I build a model where potentially biased judges verify complex states by interpreting an imperfect signal whose noise captures factual ambiguities. In a sales and a financial transaction I show that judicial biases amplify and distort factual ambiguities, creating enforcement risk. To insure against such risk, parties write simple noncontingent contracts that optimally protect the party that is most vulnerable to judicial error. These results shed light on the empirical association between law and finance and rationalize salient features of real world enforcement regimes.     

Critical mass and voice: Board gender diversity and financial reporting quality

Based on the notion that a diverse board takes a more balanced perspective and pays greater attention to financial reporting oversight, this paper examines the association between board gender diversity and financial reporting quality. Specifically, we study the enablers that allow women to add value to the monitoring activities in the context of limited affirmative actions to promote women on boards. We provide evidence that increased share of women on boards is associated with improved financial reporting quality proxied by reporting timeliness, earnings management, and auditor opinions. We find that in companies that do not have a sufficient number of women on boards, the critical mass effect can be replaced by the “voice” effect, i.e., it is still possible to improve financial reporting quality by having a woman chair the board.