我国将调整失业救济金发放标准

<正> 最近召开的全国社会保险工作会议披露,我国拟将对现行的失业救济金发放标准作适当调整。原来实行的按社会救济金120％至150％发放失业救济金,将调整为按当地法定最低工资的70％至80％发放。 据悉,调整后的失业保险给付期限,将按失业前工作时间长短划分不同档次,最长不超过24个月。期满仍未就业的,可按规定享受社会救济。对双职工失业的,可实     

关于中国失业保险制度的实证分析

失业,对于劳动者和及其家人来说,意味着收入的减少,生活水平的降低和尊严的丧失;而对于整个国家来说,意味着人力资源的浪费,如果失业持续时间长、规模大,还将导致社会的动乱。失业保险制度不仅能保障失业者及其家人基本生活、促进再就业,而且在促进劳动力市场的形成、平抑经济波动和劳动者收入再分配也有着不可忽视的作用。本文通过对近年来我国失业保险制度的有关数据进行分析,说明我国失业保险制度的现状并对其中存在的问题提出政策建议。     

国外失业保险制度在促进就业方面对我国的启示

从失业保险制度建立至今,失业保险制度的功能在不断地扩大,除保障失业人员失业期间的基本生活需要,还有预防失业和促进就业等功能,特别是西方发达国家对失业保险制度的改革积累了丰富的经验,将为我国失业保险制度的改革提供借鉴.     

如何有效利用我国失业保险基金以促进再就业

我国失业保险基金大量闲置,促进就业功能难以发挥,国内对失业保险优化相关领域的研究又基本空缺.本文针对这一问题总结了西方基于促进就业的优化失业保险的四种途径,并在此基础上根据我国目前的状况,提出了合理运用我国失业保险基金、优化我国失业保险的一系列政策建议.     

基于生存分析的失业持续时长及影响因素分析

本文以成都市失业者的抽样调查为数据,通过建立生存分析模型,探究了成都市失业者失业持续时长及其特点,并应用Cox比例风险回归模型,分析了影响失业者再就业的因素。     

浅析大学生失业保险制度的建立

伴随着1999年开始的高校扩招,2003年以来我国的大学毕业生就业问题日益突出,加剧了我国原本就十分严峻的就业形势。本文在对大学生失业的现状和原因进行分析的基础上,分析了建立大学生失业保险制度建立的必要性和可能面临的问题,提出了建立大学生失业保险制度的一些建议,试图通过建立大学生失业保险制度来缓和因大学生失业所带来的社会隐患。     

南京:就业需持绿卡

<正> 南京市于近期开始实行“就业绿卡制”。劳动者失业时,凭此证享受失业救济、参加培训;求职时,用它办理用工和调动工作单位手续。据介绍,由劳动部门统一印制的“就业绿卡”,将替代以往失业者求职和享受救济时所需的各种证件。“绿卡”除了记录就业者的身份证号码外,还记录其就业后签订、续订劳动合同情况和技能     

全球金融动荡背景下的中国失业保险制度思考

全球金融动荡背景下，我国失业保险制度面临大考，本文就特定背景下中国失业现状及失业保险凸显的缺陷进行分析，并在此基础上提出失业保险应扩大覆盖面，加强促进就业和预防失业，尤其是预防结构性失业风险等改革建议。     

对完善失业保险制度促进再就业功能的思考

失业保险是指通过建立失业保险基金，使因失业而暂时中断生活来源的劳动者在法定期间内获得失业保险金，以维持其基本生活的一种社会保险制度。目前，我国的失业保险制度更注重事后补偿，其抑制失业及促进再就业的功能没有得到发挥，加强失业保险促进再就业的功能就显得尤为重要，同时也是国际上失业保险制度发展的趋势。     

现行失业保险制度的缺陷及其完善

<正>失业是伴随着市场经济和科技发展而产生的一种社会现象,失业保险作为社会保障体系的重要组成部分,是国家以立法形式对失业人员提供经济补偿来帮助他们重新就业的制度,具有保障生活和促进就业的双重功能。从我国正式建立失业保险制度以来,经过二十多年的改革和调整,特别是2011年7月1日社会保险法实施以来,失业保险制度在分散失业风险方面发挥了不可替代的作用。但随着失业问题正     

Effects of Changes in the Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements on Job Duration — Swedish Evidence

This paper investigates the impact of the unemployment insurance (UI) entrance requirement on employment duration among earlier unemployed in Sweden. I exploit changes in the rules taking place in 1994 and 1997 to study behavioural adjustments in the timing of job separation in 1992, 1996, and 1998, respectively. Performing across‐year analyses with years involving different working requirements, I find some evidence of clustering of job exits at the time of UI qualification. By using predicted hazard rates for each week, I calculate an approximate 2.3‐week extension in average employment duration between 1996 and 1998, due to the 5‐week prolonging of the entrance requirement.     

The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Generosity on Unemployment Duration and Labor Market Transitions

This paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit generosity on labor market transitions in Turkey from 2002 to 2012. Using a unique administrative dataset, I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at 900‐paid‐premium‐days to identify the impact of generosity on the outcome variables. I find that unemployment benefit duration is increased by approximately 0.07 weeks per additional week of UI. However, more generous benefits lead to lower probabilities of transition to employment and the impact is greater compared to developed countries. In addition, workers who are entitled to longer UI periods have lower probabilities of cheating the system and rejecting the services of the Turkish Employment Agency.     

Hazard Analysis of Unemployment Duration by Gender in a Developing Country: The Case of Turkey

There is little evidence on unemployment duration and its determinants in developing countries. This study is on the duration aspect of unemployment in a developing country, Turkey. We analyse the determinants of the probability of leaving unemployment for employment or the hazard rate. The effects of the personal and household characteristics and the local labour market conditions are examined. The analyses are carried out for men and women separately. The results indicate that the nature of unemployment in Turkey exhibits similarities to the unemployment in both the developed and the developing countries.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN WELFARE STATES: THE IMPACTS OF SOFT DURATION CONSTRAINTS

Abstract Based on a major reform of Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI), we examine the behavioral impacts of soft and hard UI duration constraints. A constraint is interpreted as hard if a claimant cannot rely on any form of income support after exhaustion, and as soft if UI is replaced by follow‐on benefits or participation in active labor market programs (ALMP). We find that both hard and soft constraints raise the job hazard significantly, with surprisingly similar spikes at UI exhaustion. Participation in ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job, but at the cost of lengthening the overall job‐search period.     

Unemployment Insurance and Entrepreneurship

Based on administrative registers from Norway, we examine how unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) affect the transition rates from unemployment to regular employment and entrepreneurship, as well as subsequent earnings levels. We find that both the employment and entrepreneurship hazards rise sharply in response to UI sanctions and UI exhaustion. On average, transitions to entrepreneurship are more profitable than transitions to regular employment. While employment transitions are highly pro‐cyclical, entrepreneurship transitions are weakly counter‐cyclical. ALMPs targeted at entrepreneurship are rare in Norway, but the few start‐up subsidies that are provided are successful in terms of generating paid work.     

Shocks,Stocks, and Socks: Smoothing Consumption Over a Temporary Income Loss

We investigate how households in temporarily straitened circumstances due to an unemployment spell cut back on expenditures and how they spend marginal dollars of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit. Our theoretical and empirical analyses emphasize the importance of allowing for the fact that households buy durable as well as non‐durable goods. The theoretical analysis shows that in the short run households can cut back significantly on total expenditures without a significant fall in welfare if they concentrate their budget reductions on durables. We then present an empirical analysis based on a Canadian survey of workers who experienced a job separation. Exploiting changes in the unemployment insurance system over our sample period we show that cuts in UI benefits lead to reductions in total expenditure with a stronger impact on clothing than on food expenditures. Our empirical strategy allows that these expenditures may be non‐separable from employment status. The effects we find are particularly strong for households with no liquid assets before the spell started. These qualitative findings are in precise agreement with the theoretical predictions. (JEL: D11, D12, D91, J65)     

Two Questions about European Unemployment

A general equilibrium search model makes layoff costs affect the aggregate unemployment rate in ways that depend on equilibrium proportions of frictional and structural unemployment that in turn depend on the generosity of government unemployment benefits and skill losses among newly displaced workers. The model explains how, before the 1970s, lower flows into unemployment gave Europe lower unemployment rates than the United States and also how, after 1980, higher durations have kept unemployment rates in Europe persistently higher than in the United States. These outcomes arise from the way Europe's higher firing costs and more generous unemployment compensation make its unemployment rate respond to bigger skill losses among newly displaced workers. Those bigger skill losses also explain why U.S. workers have experienced more earnings volatility since 1980 and why, especially among older workers, hazard rates of gaining employment in Europe now fall sharply with increases in the duration of unemployment.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN EUROPE: UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION AND SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT STABILITY

This paper provides evidence on the effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment and subsequent employment duration in Europe using individual data from the European Community Household Panel. Country‐specific estimates based on a multivariate discrete‐time duration model, which takes into account dynamic selection issues and the endogeneity of benefit receipt, suggest that although receiving benefits has an adverse effect in the sense of increasing unemployment duration, there is also a positive effect associated with the increased duration of subsequent employment. This beneficial effect of unemployment insurance on employment stability is pronounced in countries with relatively generous benefit systems, and for recipients who have remained unemployed for at least six months. These findings are in line with theories that suggest a matching effect of unemployment insurance. (JEL: J64, J65, C41)     

Do Benefit Hikes Damage Job Finding? Evidence from Swedish Unemployment Insurance Reforms

Abstract. In 2001 and 2002, Sweden introduced several unemployment insurance reforms. A major innovation in the first reform was the introduction of a two‐tiered benefit structure for some unemployed individuals. This system involved supplementary compensation during the first 20 weeks of unemployment. The 2002 reform retained the two‐tiered benefit structure but involved also substantial benefit hikes for spells exceeding 20 weeks. This paper examines how these reforms affected transitions from unemployment to employment. We take advantage of the fact that the reforms had quasi‐experimental features where the ‘treatments’ differed considerably among unemployed individuals. We find that the reforms had strikingly different effects on job finding among men and women. The two reforms in conjunction are estimated to have increased the expected duration of unemployment among men but to have decreased the duration of unemployment among women. The overall effect on the duration of unemployment is not statistically different from zero. However, the reforms reduced job finding among men who remained unemployed for more than 20 weeks.     

Financing Unemployment Benefits: Dismissal versus Employment Taxes

Abstract. This paper investigates the effects of using dismissal taxes to finance unemployment benefits. We compare dismissal and employment taxes in a model with search frictions. Employment taxes give rise to externalities because firms do not take into account the effects their dismissal decisions have on others. These externalities can be tackled by using dismissal taxes to finance unemployment insurance. Taking into account the budget for unemployment insurance, employment taxes can be reduced by more than is necessary to offset the adverse effect of dismissal taxes on the value of the firm. The introduction of dismissal taxes leads to higher job creation and lower unemployment.