Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Security of the systems is normally interdependent in such a way that security risks of one part affect other parts and threats spread through the vulnerable links in the network. So, the risks of the systems can be mitigated through investments in the security of interconnecting links. This article takes an innovative look at the problem of security investment of nodes on their vulnerable links in a given contagious network as a game‐theoretic model that can be applied to a variety of applications including information systems. In the proposed game model, each node computes its corresponding risk based on the value of its assets, vulnerabilities, and threats to determine the optimum level of security investments on its external links respecting its limited budget. Furthermore, direct and indirect nonlinear influences of a node's security investment on the risks of other nodes are considered. The existence and uniqueness of the game's Nash equilibrium in the proposed game are also proved. Further analysis of the model in a practical case revealed that taking advantage of the investment effects of other players, perfectly rational players (i.e., those who use the utility function of the proposed game model) make more cost‐effective decisions than selfish nonrational or semirational players.     

The quantile-based flattened logistic distribution: Some properties and applications

In this paper, the quantile-based flattened logistic distribution has been studied. Some classical and quantile-based properties of the distribution have been obtained. Closed form expressions of L-moments, L-moment ratios and expectation of order statistics of the distribution have been obtained. A quantile-based analysis concerning the method of matching L-moments estimation is employed to estimate the parameters of the proposed model. We further derive the asymptotic variance–covariance matrix of the matching L-Moments estimators of the proposed model. Finally, we apply the proposed model to simulated as well as two real life datasets and compare the fit with the logistic distribution.     

Beyond tail median and conditional tail expectation: Extreme risk estimation using tail Lp-optimization

The conditional tail expectation (CTE) is an indicator of tail behavior that takes into account both the frequency and magnitude of a tail event. However, the asymptotic normality of its empirical estimator requires that the underlying distribution possess a finite variance; this can be a strong restriction in actuarial and financial applications. A valuable alternative is the median shortfall (MS), although it only gives information about the frequency of a tail event. We construct a class of tail L^p-medians encompassing the MS and CTE. For p in (1,2), a tail L^p-median depends on both the frequency and magnitude of tail events, and its empirical estimator is, within the range of the data, asymptotically normal under a condition weaker than a finite variance. We extrapolate this estimator and another technique to extreme levels using the heavy-tailed framework. The estimators are showcased on a simulation study and on real fire insurance data.     

通货紧缩的经济社会效应分析

通货紧缩作为经济运行中的一种常态现象 ,必然对经济、社会产生多方面影响。其效应表现为 :通过一般物价水平的下降以及对现存市场供求关系的破坏 ,对生产产生促退效应 ,导致失业率上升 ;总体上降低居民的消费能力 ;造成分配不公 ,导致社会财富由债务人向债权人、由国家向公众、由企业向消费者、由低收入者向高收入者的转移。针对通货紧缩的负效应 ,政府要采取措施 ,抑制分配不公 ,适当地向收入较低的普通百姓倾斜 ;企业要抓住机遇 ,尽快清理库存 ,同时狠抓技术创新、质量提高和内部管理 ,为新一轮发展作准备 ;居民要调整“买涨不买落”的传统心态 ,树立消费新观念。     

人力资本投资与个人收入能力

讨论了人力资本的经济价值，通过建立教育投资模型，训练投资模型及流动投资模型，指出了正规教育投资，在职培训投资，迁移与流动投资对人力资本收入能力的影响。经分析表明，个人的人力资本现时存量与个人的未来收入能力之间存在正相关。     

企业价格竞争决策的博弈分析 —— 以当前我国PDA市场的价格战为例

博弈论是研究决策主体的行为发生直接相互作用时的决策及决策的均衡问题。运用博弈论 ,可以清楚地分析营销环境中每一个竞争者的行为及反应 ,使企业做到知己知彼 ,百战不殆。文章通过建立博弈模型 ,对当前“PDA市场的价格战”作了初步博弈分析 ,并得出结论 ,以指导企业的价格竞争策略     

农业投入中政府与农户的博弈分析

农业投入状况关系着农业生产和农村经济的发展。目前农业投入不足已成为制约我国整体经济发展的“瓶颈”。在是否增加农业投入的问题上,政府与农户之间存在着一种博弈关系。通过农业投入不足的现状考察,用博弈的方法阐释农业投入不足的原因,提出加大农业投入的几点对策。     

指数级数的增长性和值分布

本文研究了随机狄里克莱级数 在随机变量序列{Xn}独立（可不同分布）以及满足等条件时的增长性以及值分布,得到了一些新的结果.     

一类带有分布参数系统的最佳控制

本文给出一类非均匀弦的横向振动的最佳控制，推广了P C Park的结果。这一结果同样适用于同类型振动问题。