PC软件产品竞争性升级的定价研究

通过Hotelling模型对PC软件产品竞争性升级进行了研究,重点分析了网络外部性、转换成本、升级产品质量(或功能)的提高对升级定价及其竞争策略的影响.主要成果包括以下几个方面(1)在消费者静态预期的条件下,网络规模大的厂商总是偏好不兼容,网络规模小的厂商偏好全兼容.(2)分析了影响版本升级价格、竞争性价格和全价的相关因素.(3)解释了转换成本和实施竞争性升级的关系.(4)分析了厂商夺取竞争对手厂商客户的条件以及争夺新客户的竞争策略.对厂商的竞争性升级定价具有重要的理论指导意义.     

A Framework for Analyzing the Economic Tradeoffs Between Urban Commerce and Security Against Terrorism

This article presents a framework for economic consequence analysis of terrorism countermeasures. It specifies major categories of direct and indirect costs, benefits, spillover effects, and transfer payments that must be estimated in a comprehensive assessment. It develops a spreadsheet tool for data collection, storage, and refinement, as well as estimation of the various components of the necessary economic accounts. It also illustrates the usefulness of the framework in the first assessment of the tradeoffs between enhanced security and changes in commercial activity in an urban area, with explicit attention to the role of spillover effects. The article also contributes a practical user interface to the model for emergency managers.     

光滑暧昧模型下的不透明交易和管制措施研究

本文假定透明交易者对额外投资机会回报率的标准差(方差,投资风险)存在暧昧,这种认知暧昧性抑制了透明交易者的投资行为,会导致风险资产溢价过高及社会福利损失.透明交易者是暧昧厌恶的投资者,其投资决策依据光滑暧昧厌恶模型,需求函数呈现连续且光滑的特征.而不透明交易者,通过支付一定的信息获取成本获得私有信息而具有信息优势,他们是标准的风险厌恶的投资者.通过构建理性预期均衡,本文的研究发现:初始资产严格为正的透明交易者将获得严格为正的超额收益;提高信息获取成本将减少不透明交易者的比例,从而增加风险资产溢价,降低福利水平,因而不是一项好的管制措施;而旨在提高市场透明度降低交易者暧昧性的举措总有利于提高福利水平.     

A Five-Decision Testing Procedure to Infer the Value of a Unidimensional Parameter

ABSTRACT

A statistical test can be seen as a procedure to produce a decision based on observed data, where some decisions consist of rejecting a hypothesis (yielding a significant result) and some do not, and where one controls the probability to make a wrong rejection at some prespecified significance level. Whereas traditional hypothesis testing involves only two possible decisions (to reject or not a null hypothesis), Kaiser’s directional two-sided test as well as the more recently introduced testing procedure of Jones and Tukey, each equivalent to running two one-sided tests, involve three possible decisions to infer the value of a unidimensional parameter. The latter procedure assumes that a point null hypothesis is impossible (e.g., that two treatments cannot have exactly the same effect), allowing a gain of statistical power. There are, however, situations where a point hypothesis is indeed plausible, for example, when considering hypotheses derived from Einstein’s theories. In this article, we introduce a five-decision rule testing procedure, equivalent to running a traditional two-sided test in addition to two one-sided tests, which combines the advantages of the testing procedures of Kaiser (no assumption on a point hypothesis being impossible) and Jones and Tukey (higher power), allowing for a nonnegligible (typically 20%) reduction of the sample size needed to reach a given statistical power to get a significant result, compared to the traditional approach.     

Total Economic Consequences of an Influenza Outbreak in the United States

Pandemic influenza represents a serious threat not only to the population of the United States, but also to its economy. In this study, we analyze the total economic consequences of potential influenza outbreaks in the United States for four cases based on the distinctions between disease severity and the presence/absence of vaccinations. The analysis is based on data and parameters on influenza obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and the general literature. A state‐of‐the‐art economic impact modeling approach, computable general equilibrium, is applied to analyze a wide range of potential impacts stemming from the outbreaks. This study examines the economic impacts from changes in medical expenditures and workforce participation, and also takes into consideration different types of avoidance behavior and resilience actions not previously fully studied. Our results indicate that, in the absence of avoidance and resilience effects, a pandemic influenza outbreak could result in a loss in U.S. GDP of $25.4 billion, but that vaccination could reduce the losses to $19.9 billion. When behavioral and resilience factors are taken into account, a pandemic influenza outbreak could result in GDP losses of $45.3 billion without vaccination and $34.4 billion with vaccination. These results indicate the importance of including a broader set of causal factors to achieve more accurate estimates of the total economic impacts of not just pandemic influenza but biothreats in general. The results also highlight a number of actionable items that government policymakers and public health officials can use to help reduce potential economic losses from the outbreaks.     

自驾偏好、居民异质与居住选址——基于单中心城市模型的空间均衡分析

基于线性单中心城市模型，研究了自驾偏好和居民拥有车辆异质性对双方式交通走廊沿线居民出行方式选择和居住区位选址均衡的影响.将有车居民对自驾出行的偏好集成到直接效用函数中，建立了空间均衡模型.分析发现，当城市居民全部自驾出行时，租金-距离可能呈现先提高后降低的趋势.考虑只有部分居民拥有自驾车辆的一般情形，推导出了有车和无车居民在城市走廊沿线居住分布的不同均衡模式.通过理论解析，进一步考察了小汽车保有量和城市居民数量的变化对城市空间结构和居民效用水平的影响.     

劣势耐用品厂商的产品质保期与质保服务投入策略研究

在实际中，消费者购买耐用品时均同时获得厂商提供的质保服务，由于产品质保服务影响着消费者的产品使用效用，因此耐用品定价、质保期和产品质保服务投入是影响厂商利润的主要因素。考虑双寡头市场环境下，建立微分博弈模型讨论单位产品质保服务投入和产品质保期对双寡头厂商均衡价格的影响。结论表明双寡头厂商的单位产品质保服务投入越高、质保期越长，均衡价格越高；但单位产品保服务投入与质保服务对消费者效用影响系数的关系影响着竞争对手在均衡价格的变化趋势；劣势的低质量厂商可以通过增加单位产品质保服务投入策略或延长质保期的策略实现在均衡下与高质量厂商以同等价格销售耐用品，但劣势厂商增加单位产品质保服务投入策略要优于延长质保期策略。最后，利用数值分析进一步验证了所得结论的有效性。     

正常商品的替代效应与收入效应研究

目前,国内外的微观经济学教科书中,关于正常商品的替代效应和收入效应的图形说明很不一致。主要是关于正常商品降价后新的预算线上的均衡点和原始预算线上的均衡点的位置不同。为此,在给定消费者效用函数和预算线方程的基础上,通过对正常商品降价(涨价)后带来的总效应、替代效应以及收入效应进行数理分析,使人们达到完整准确地理解和掌握正常商品的替代效应和收入效应的目的。     

The Food Crisis and its Impacts on Poverty in Senegal and Mali: Crossed Destinies

This article uses two CGE macro‐micro models to analyse the distributional impact of the food crisis and policy responses in two neighbouring African countries, both of which are strongly dependent on agriculture. The approach captures structural differences at both the macro and micro level for household income and expenditure structures, and the results reveal differences for poverty impact at the national and sub‐group levels, as well as for inequality and pro‐poor analysis. The importance of country‐specific analysis and the risk of extrapolating conclusions from one country to another are also highlighted.     

A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats

This paper concerns the two‐stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the “Nash bargaining with endogenous threats” solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two‐person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problematic than in Nash's static setting. The analysis can be extended to stochastic games with contracts.