Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat

This article uses a game‐theoretic approach to analyze the risk of cross‐milieu terrorist collaboration—the possibility that, despite marked ideological differences, extremist groups from very different milieus might align to a degree where operational collaboration against Western societies becomes possible. Based upon theoretical insights drawn from a variety of literatures, a bargaining model is constructed that reflects the various benefits and costs for terrorists’ collaboration across ideological milieus. Analyzed in both sequential and simultaneous decision‐making contexts and through numerical simulations, the model confirms several theoretical arguments. The most important of these is that although likely to be quite rare, successful collaboration across terrorist milieus is indeed feasible in certain circumstances. The model also highlights several structural elements that might play a larger role than previously recognized in the collaboration decision, including that the prospect of nonmaterial gains (amplification of terror and reputational boost) plays at least as important a role in the decision to collaborate as potential increased capabilities does. Numerical simulation further suggests that prospects for successful collaboration over most scenarios (including operational) increase when a large, effective Islamist terrorist organization initiates collaboration with a smaller right‐wing group, as compared with the other scenarios considered. Although the small number of historical cases precludes robust statistical validation, the simulation results are supported by existing empirical evidence of collaboration between Islamists and right‐ or left‐wing extremists. The game‐theoretic approach, therefore, provides guidance regarding the circumstances under which such an unholy alliance of violent actors is likely to succeed.     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.     

土地征收进程中不同参与主体行为研究

城镇化进程中农民集体所有土地转变为城市国有土地,在该过程中产生大量的土地增值收益。地方政府、用地企业、村委会和农民在土地增值收益分配中有不同的行为表现,其根本原因在于利益分配冲突。从不同主体行为角度对土地增值收益分配中利益冲突问题进行研究,有利于探讨利益冲突背后的原因并提出有针对性的政策建议。     

从整体观看体育教学的诸环节及协同关系

搞好体育教学需要课前准备、课中实施和课后研究三个环节的协同,弱化任何一环都难以取得真正意义上的好的教学效果。     

吉林省社区体育教育职能的醒觉——参加吉林省国家级社体指导员培训的启示

本文通过文献资料法、实地考察法和专家访谈法等对吉林省社区体育的发展状况进行研究,研究发现:吉林省群众体育事业正在逐步发展壮大,社区体育的教育职能得到明显的发展.人们在从生存体育向享受体育的转化过程中,潜移默化地接受体育的教育职能;在吉林省社区体育中,中老年女性群体是参加健身运动的骨干力量.男性则成为社区健身运动的薄弱群体;吉林省社区体育参与者面临的主要问题表现在对体育教育职能不够理解,社会体育指导员队伍的建设仍然是社会体育发展的重点问题.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game

Using data from a large representative US sample (N = 1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values.     

习近平新时代体育外交的实践探析

运用文献资料法和逻辑分析法等研究方法,以构建人类命运共同体为切入视角,对习近平新时代体育外交思想进行深入分析。研究认为,习近平新时代体育外交主要内容包括:赛事外交是主流;足球外交成亮点;多边合作是关键。习近平新时代体育外交思想是中国外交思想的重要组成部分之一,是对中共历代领导人体育外交思想的继承和发展,也是建设新时代体育强国的内在要求。习近平新时代体育外交思想内涵丰富且意蕴深远,不仅展现了我国新时代外交多元化发展的一面,也促进了中国对外沟通、交流及合作,具有十分重要的意义。     

形式与意义:儿童文学作品中的游戏精神

儿童文学的"游戏精神"主要是指在儿童作品文本中体现出的、通过人物游戏所传递的一种符合儿童心理需求和审美旨趣,并实现儿童内心愿望的精神。周作人认为儿童文学的游戏精神是"幻想精神""愉悦精神"和"自由精神"。儿童文学游戏精神具有快乐性、幻想性和自由性的三性特征"。游戏精神"在儿童文学中作品的主要呈现形式为:通过"顽童""小大人""、反派"等人物形象的塑造凸显游戏精神;通过故事情节蕴涵的笨拙与聪明、嬉笑与吵闹、虚拟与真实凸显游戏精神;通过语言夸张凸显荒诞美、语言颠倒凸显逆向思维、语言突转凸显惊奇,从而凸显游戏精神。游戏精神对于儿童文学作品编创的意义在于:游戏精神是儿童文学的基本属性和内涵所在,新媒介时代儿童文学的发展需要延续游戏精神。因此游戏精神是儿童文学的作品编创的重要依据和准则。     

和谐社会视角下高校体育文化发展策略探析

阐述了校园体育文化的涵义及和谐校园的内涵,分析了高校体育文化的特征,提出了在和谐社会视角下发展高校校园体育文化的几点策略。指出了高校体育文化建设能促进和谐校园的形成。