真伪之辩——基于新近材料的“海德格尔事件”核心问题研究

新近出版的《海德格尔兄弟通信集》为“海德格尔事件”研究的突破性进展提供了非常重要的文本资料，为澄清诸多疑难问题提供了一个关键契机。受此推动，本文将对“海德格尔事件”的核心问题展开追问:海德格尔在校长任职动机问题上的自我辩护是谎言还是事实?胡戈·奥特在其研究中批评海德格尔的辩护乃是撒谎，这一判断以种种变式影响着今天的《黑皮笔记》研究;但依据更多材料和更严谨的分析，可以看出奥特这一具有重大影响力的研究工作存在严重漏洞，扭曲了事实，而多年来一直被质疑的海德格尔自我辩护反倒符合事实。这一发现不仅揭示出了重新全面解读“海德格尔事件”的必要性，而且推动着我们去沉思相关论战一再爆发的深层原因，这将有助于我们走上真正的疑难澄清之路。     

海德格尔的“实用主义”和本原思想——对奥克伦特的海德格尔解读之实用主义视角的反思

对海德格尔的实用主义解读构成了美国海德格尔学者们的一个重要研究进路,但是实用主义视角下的海德格尔在欧陆学者看来是对海德格尔的曲解,因为这一视角抹去了海德格尔现象学的先验维度或者说本原思想。本文以奥克伦特对海德格尔时间性概念的实用主义解读为例,阐明海德格尔时间性概念的本原意义如何在实用主义视角下被消解,并指出海德格尔的本原思想在这一视角中“隐身”的根源。     

论海德格尔技术观

海德格尔是20世纪德国著名的哲学家,作为后现代哲学思潮的先驱,海德格尔对技术进行了一系列深刻的本质探讨,而成为学界公认的对技术"存在论"进行追问和创新的哲学家,本文探讨了海德格尔的技术观,对其进行了梳理和评判。     

Boon or bust? Heidegger,disability aesthetics and the thalidomide memorial

Disability Studies has begun to interrogate the aesthetics of disability, both in terms of artwork and sensuous apprehension more generally. The present paper is a contribution to this burgeoning literature. Here I seek to demonstrate what the aesthetics of Martin Heidegger offer to that project. I do so in three stages. I begin by reviewing some relevant disability studies literature, highlighting some general themes in Disability Studies’ recent engagement with ‘the aesthetic’, widely defined. Next, I turn to the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, to add some further philosophical depth to this project. In third and final section, I apply Heidegger’s aesthetics to the recently unveiled thalidomide memorial, to demonstrate the empirical worth of his analysis of artwork. I conclude with suggestions for future Disability Studies.     

对孟子“夭寿不贰”句之解读--以海德格尔《存在与时间》中的生存论思想为参照

孟子云“夭寿不贰，修身以俟之，所以立命也”，其中包含着“夭寿（生死）与命之间的关系”以及“修身立命”这两方面的问题。海德格尔《存在与时间》在时间的视域下，将此在解读为“向死而在”，与言说“生生之大德”的儒者形成一种互补关系。命定的偶然性（个体的人必然有具体的实质限定）、必死性（有限个体必有其死）和使命义（人禀受善性而有道德使命）这三者构成了《孟子》中的“命”义。孟子反求诸己，追求人的本然善性和生之尊严；海德格尔则认为面对死亡的决断，是个体成为本真存在的关键，而儒者的生活方式可视作本真存在的一种可能性。     

Action,Technology, and the Homogenisation of Place: Why Climate Change is Antithetical to Political Action

According to Hannah Arendt, the concept of ‘political action’ is a fundamental component of the human condition because it encapsulates how the uniqueness of each human being intersects to create unpredictable political initiatives and effects. Recently, despite being one of the most daunting political challenges ever faced by humanity, there has been a noted collective action failure, or inaction, concerning the global threat of anthropogenic climate change. Why? This article seeks to explain this political inaction in a new way: by examining the metaphysical role that technology plays in disclosing the climate as a thinkable and global object. After applying the philosophy of Martin Heidegger to the complex mathematical general circulation models (GCMs) used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), this article details how the metaphysics underlying GCMs manifests the perceivable world by ‘enframing’ it, or by implicitly representing subjects, objects, and Nature itself, as a predictable, calculable, and orderable relation of static forces. When this metaphysical and mathematical uniformity constructs the climate as a calculable object that is globalised through the IPCC, it is ultimately found to be contradictory to the distinctness and unpredictability necessary for distinct human action to occur. Paradoxically, therefore, political action is argued to be metaphysically antithetical to the technologically enframed science, politics, and discourse, of global climate change itself. The importance of distinct and plural human places, when filtered through GCMs, becomes subsumed by the climate as a homogenous, calculative, and politically inactive, global object.     

海德格尔独特技术哲学观的原因探究

海德格尔通过批判雅斯贝尔斯等人的技术观,认为技术其本质,并非中立的工具,也非人的行为,而是促逼着的解蔽,他称之为＂座架＂。海德格尔对技术本质的追问形成了不同于其他技术哲学家的技术观原因有三：一是深受自己构建的哲学理论思想的影响;二是从技术本身出发来追问技术;三是他着重探讨技术与物的关系。     

存在·此在·人——海德格尔"死亡"现象学的三个维度

死亡问题是海德格尔哲学的重要课题之一。死亡之于存在意义的投射具有三个维度:建构死亡自身的源始根据,即存在维度;终极可能性问题的生存论筹划,即此在维度;历史性能在的死亡现象学还原,即人之维度。从这三个维度洞察死亡,可以将诠释学和现象学融汇于同一参照系。而海德格尔在死亡思想意蕴上的变迁,则是存在意义在这三个维度框架中的交错重现。     

Understanding care for the poor in rural Russia

The issues surrounding care and care-provision have been key themes in social scientific research, yet the intersections between care and poverty, particularly in rural contexts, have not been sufficiently explored. This paper addresses this gap by studying care for the poor in rural Russia. It argues that isolated, disengaged and decontextualised caring interventions often ignore situated possibilities and traditions of care and overlook what matters to poor people. To overcome this problem, the paper uses 20 and 22 dwelling approach to prioritise a relational framework that focuses on care as concern, solicitude and possibilities for supportive action in the context of rural Russia. Using examples from fieldwork in two Russian villages, the paper stresses the constitutive role of non-representable practices of care which provide the ontological basis for recognising and understanding the worldviews and coping practices of the poor. It concludes with conceptual observations about alternative approaches to care, relations to others and responsibility for the rural poor.     

回到海德格尔

在海德格尔的全部学术思想发展进程中,始终同步存在着两种完全不同的思之道路和双重思想构境——"克服形而上学"的争执性思想场域和"绝弃存在"的本有诗性之思境。克服形而上学,就是在重返柏拉图和亚里士多德的开启的第一开端中,超越性地让存在者归基,即重新扎根于作为其真实根据的存在。"绝弃存在"这条全新道路的基石却是被打上叉的存在,即"存有"(Seyn)历史之思,在这条没有了理性炫目之光的幽暗小径上,打开一切存在的涌现和用在性将为存在之弃让所替代,解蔽之真理性认知和逻各斯之主导性追问生成的抽象聚集,将为存有的基础性追问中的真理本现和归隐所取代。在海德格尔的思想发展中,根本不存在断裂式的思想转向,只有一个海德格尔!只是这个海德格尔在对希腊原初本原之境的双重返回中,同时置身于"第一开端"的形而上学之路解构之战和在"另一开端"的本有之思中的道说本现之中。应该说,海德格尔在两个思想构境层中的辛苦努力都是一贯到底的。