Sharing the surplus and proportional values

Theory and Decision - We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between her stand-alone worth and the average...     

Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment

Sanctioning increases cooperation in public goods games, but not indiscriminately under all conditions and in all societies, and the mechanisms by which sanctioning exercises its impact on behavior are yet to be studied in detail. We show experimentally that in the presence of sanctioning, our experimental subjects adjust their behavior in order to avoid being a free rider. They do this not only in the STANDARD sanctions treatment, where they directly experience any sanctions assigned to them, but also in our main treatment, the SECRET sanctions treatment, where no information on sanctions received is available until the end of the experiment. We observe no such free riding avoidance in the treatment without sanctioning. The mere knowledge that sanctions might be assigned increases cooperation among the members of our subject pool; subjects expect that non-strategic sanctioning occurs against the free riders. Moreover, these expectations are correct as we observe a similar pattern and extent of sanctioning in both treatments. We propose that sanctioning in itself is a social norm and may be culturally dependent, as suggested in the literature.     

Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values

Theory and Decision - In cooperative game theory with transferable utilities (TU games), there are two well-established ways of redistributing Shapley value payoffs: using egalitarian Shapley...     

Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values

One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide three different characterizations of egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. First, from the perspective of a variable player set, we show that all these solutions satisfy the same reduced game consistency. Second, on a fixed player set, we characterize this class of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, towards a strategic foundation, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions which only differ in the probability of breakdown at a certain stage of the game. These characterizations discover fundamental differences as well as intriguing connections between marginalism and egalitarianism.     

Multiculturalism and social cohesion: A Japanese community’s perceptions of “being Australian”

Based on a large‐scale survey conducted with parents from Japanese language schools in Sydney in 2015, this paper aims to review multiple dimensions of social cohesion in the Japanese ethnic community in Australia. Looking at several indices such as economic, political, and cultural integration, the paper describes the social profile of the Japanese ethnic community, questioning the generic perception of the community as a coherent body of middle‐class migrants in Australia. This was achieved through a comparative analysis with outcomes of a national survey of the Australian population on social cohesion and draws attention to the ways in which a particular sense of social cohesion with Australian society is constructed by Japanese migrants. The study found a differentiated sense of belonging to the local community, country of residence (Australia), and nation of origin (Japan). It found communal diversity in the Japanese community resulting from there being a majority of women migrants who were part of cross‐border marriages and their children living in multicultural family circumstances. It was concluded that this configuration within the community leads to advocacy related to a re‐identification as a possible ethnic group of migrants that should be recognized in an inclusive migration settlement policy in Australia.     

Correction to: Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values

Theory and Decision - In sub-Sect. 3.3, the terms “one-person” and “(n-1)-person” were incorrectly updated by mistake during the correction stage in the online...     

Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.