从主权国家的兴衰看权力博弈形态的转型

传统的国际关系理论,无论是现实主义、自由主义、建构主义还是科学行为主义理论,都是把主权国家抽象成一个统一的国际关系行为体。这一行为主体有一致的利益,也自然要有一致的对外政策目标和手段。在20世纪,尤其是在两次世界大战和冷战期间,这一概念抽象是非常准确的。但冷战结束以后,尤其是进入21世纪以后,这一概念抽象逐渐与国际关系的现实相违背。一方面,国家综合实力并不能直接转化为具体领域的竞争优势;另一方面,很多国家,包括超级大国在内,其对外政策的主要阻力可能不是所谓的竞争对手,而是其国内不同的利益集团。这导致传统的国际关系理论,从假设到概念和推理层面,都已经无法解释和预测今天的世界,而权力小博弈理论可以为认识多元复杂互动博弈时代的国际关系提供一个新的解释框架。     

Price bias and common practice in option pricing

Generally, the semiclosed-form option pricing formula for complex financial models depends on unobservable factors such as stochastic volatility and jump intensity. A popular practice is to use an estimate of these latent factors to compute the option price. However, in many situations this plug-and-play approximation does not yield the appropriate price. This article examines this bias and quantifies its impacts. We decompose the bias into terms that are related to the bias on the unobservable factors and to the precision of their point estimators. The approximated price is found to be highly biased when only the history of the stock price is used to recover the latent states. This bias is corrected when option prices are added to the sample used to recover the states' best estimate. We also show numerically that such a bias is propagated on calibrated parameters, leading to erroneous values. The Canadian Journal of Statistics 48: 8–35; 2020 © 2019 Statistical Society of Canada     

Who Should Pay for Interdependent Risk? Policy Implications for Security Interdependence Among Airports

We study interdependent risks in security, and shed light on the economic and policy implications of increasing security interdependence in presence of reactive attackers. We investigate the impact of potential public policy arrangements on the security of a group of interdependent organizations, namely, airports. Focusing on security expenditures and costs to society, as assessed by a social planner, to individual airports and to attackers, we first develop a game-theoretic framework, and derive explicit Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solutions in the airports network. We then conduct numerical experiments mirroring real-world cyber scenarios, to assess how a change in interdependence impact the airports' security expenditures, the overall expected costs to society, and the fairness of security financing. Our study provides insights on the economic and policy implications for the United States, Europe, and Asia.     

不同冷链服务模式下生鲜农产品供应链决策

基于单物流服务商、单供应商和单零售商构成的生鲜农产品供应链，构建3种冷链服务模式：承诺模式、提前要求模式与延后要求模式，探讨不同冷链服务模式对定价与冷链服务水平、企业绩效的影响。研究发现：某种冷链服务模式是否有利于消减数量与质量损耗依赖于产品易腐性、冷链服务成本及其分担比例。供应链成员无法在承诺模式与提前要求模式下形成统一的模式偏好。当物流服务商承担的冷链服务成本比例较低时，相比于提前要求模式，供应商偏好承诺模式，否则，偏好提前要求模式。承诺模式比提前要求模式更有利于物流服务商，然而对于零售商，结果正好相反。数值实验表明，虽然供应链成员无法对冷链服务模式形成整体的一致性偏好，但仍可实现局部的一致性偏好。     

Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Security of the systems is normally interdependent in such a way that security risks of one part affect other parts and threats spread through the vulnerable links in the network. So, the risks of the systems can be mitigated through investments in the security of interconnecting links. This article takes an innovative look at the problem of security investment of nodes on their vulnerable links in a given contagious network as a game‐theoretic model that can be applied to a variety of applications including information systems. In the proposed game model, each node computes its corresponding risk based on the value of its assets, vulnerabilities, and threats to determine the optimum level of security investments on its external links respecting its limited budget. Furthermore, direct and indirect nonlinear influences of a node's security investment on the risks of other nodes are considered. The existence and uniqueness of the game's Nash equilibrium in the proposed game are also proved. Further analysis of the model in a practical case revealed that taking advantage of the investment effects of other players, perfectly rational players (i.e., those who use the utility function of the proposed game model) make more cost‐effective decisions than selfish nonrational or semirational players.     

基于平均电价的在线电动汽车充电排程定价机制

考虑在一个区域内单个充电站为多辆电动汽车(充电顾客)提供充电服务的排程与定价问题.充电顾客的排程(排序)有三种可选择的机制,即从高到低将待充电顾客按下列准则进行排序:1)顾客充电的总报价;2)顾客充电的单位报价;3)顾客在当前时间点之前已充电量的价值.基于上述充电排程机制,提出了一种基于顾客已充电量的平均电价且不依赖未来充电需求的定价机制,证明了所提出的排程定价机制具有个体理性和激励兼容特性.与已有的按顾客获得的最后一单位待充电价格进行定价的方法相比,研究发现:在第1)或第2)种排程机制下,所提出的定价机制顾客充电最终支付价格的期望相同,但方差减小;在第3)种排程机制下,所提出的定价机制顾客最终支付价格的期望和方差均减小.算例结果展示了所提出定价机制在减小充电顾客最终支付价格不确定性方面的作用与效果.     

企业价格竞争决策的博弈分析 —— 以当前我国PDA市场的价格战为例

博弈论是研究决策主体的行为发生直接相互作用时的决策及决策的均衡问题。运用博弈论 ,可以清楚地分析营销环境中每一个竞争者的行为及反应 ,使企业做到知己知彼 ,百战不殆。文章通过建立博弈模型 ,对当前“PDA市场的价格战”作了初步博弈分析 ,并得出结论 ,以指导企业的价格竞争策略     

农业投入中政府与农户的博弈分析

农业投入状况关系着农业生产和农村经济的发展。目前农业投入不足已成为制约我国整体经济发展的“瓶颈”。在是否增加农业投入的问题上,政府与农户之间存在着一种博弈关系。通过农业投入不足的现状考察,用博弈的方法阐释农业投入不足的原因,提出加大农业投入的几点对策。     

期权定价理论在技术商品定价中的应用探讨

技术商品不同于一般商品 ,具有报酬无限、风险有限的特性 ,尤其与支付红利的美式看涨期权特点极为相似。应用传统的资产评估方法为技术商品定价 ,其结果很难真实反映技术商品的价值。期权定价理论为技术商品的科学定价提供了一种新思路 ,特别是支付红利的美式看涨期权定价模型对解决技术商品价值评估有参考价值     

关于人性论的博弈分析

中国的人性论生发出的圣人治国,是对人性的否定,产生的是囚徒困境难题;西方的人性论产生的是法律治国,是对人性的肯定,破解了囚徒困境难题.从博弈论视角看,出现如此分野的原因是,中国古代社会政治家们试图设计一种仅有帕累托最优均衡的制度,但因为没有从现实的人性出发,导致只能依靠人治维护表面的帕累托最优均衡,实际上存在的却是囚徒困境;西方社会的政治家们则以承认人性为前提,设计了一种帕累托次优均衡的制度.