| 廉政保证金制度的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 屈颖,贾志永.廉政保证金制度的博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报(社会科学版),2005,6(4):115-118. |
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| 作者姓名： | 屈颖 贾志永 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 广东交通职业技术学院,广东,广州,510650;西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川,成都,610031
2. 西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川,成都,610031 |
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| 摘 要： | 为遏制腐败,我国一些地方和单位采用了“廉政保证金制度”。在博弈分析中,国家公职人员和政府为博弈方,分析结果表明:采用廉政保证金制度既能降低个人腐败的概率,又能提高政府监管有力的概率,对遏制腐败具有双重作用;结合我国实际情况,目前的廉政保证金制度对遏制腐败的作用是很小的。
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| 关 键 词： | 廉政保证金制度 腐败 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-4474(2005)04-0115-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年7月16日 |
Analysis of Honest Administration Deposit System with Game Theory |
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| Qu Ying,JIA Zhi-yong.Analysis of Honest Administration Deposit System with Game Theory[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong Universit(Social Science Edition),2005,6(4):115-118. |
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| Authors: | Qu Ying JIA Zhi-yong |
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| Abstract: | In order to contain corruption, the honest administration deposit system is adopted by some local governments and units. In the analysis of the game system with the civil servants and the government as analysis objects, the result shows that in terms of corruption containment honest administration deposit system can decrease the probability of personal corruption and increase the efficiency of government supervision. Under the specific national conditions of China, the honest administration deposit system plays a less effective role in corruption containment at present. |
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| Keywords: | honest administration deposit system corruption game theory |
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